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GRASSROOTS CHALLENGES TO THE
EFFECTS OF PRISON SPRAWL ON
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR
INCARCERATED PEOPLE
Stefen R. Short*
ABSTRACT

New York State’s prison system is broken in several ways, many of
which are linked to a fundamental geographical problem. Almost all
of New York’s fifty-four state prisons are located in rural, underresourced communities. Prison units serving people with mental
health needs are concentrated in communities with major physician
shortages. Without a drastic influx of resources, New York’s prisons
will continue to over-utilize “half-measures,” such as video
teleconferencing, in a failed attempt to meet the mental health needs
of incarcerated people. Lawyers continue to develop strategies—
most of which are based in Eighth Amendment litigation—to either
improve prison mental health care or increase prison mental health
resources. But litigation is not the solution to every social problem
and it most likely will not solve this problem on its own. Eighth
Amendment litigation cannot change demographics, ameliorate
physician shortages, or reverse prison sprawl.
Movement lawyers have known since time immemorial that
grassroots approaches to major social problems—those that engage
communities directly impacted and intentionally subsume the role of
lawyers and legal work—create the most sustainable type of change.
Grassroots approaches have successfully addressed prison and jail
siting problems in New York. This Article argues that only through
grassroots approaches can movement lawyers, activists, and advocates
*
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address the underlying geographical problems causing the overuse of
video teleconferencing, and other quality of care deficiencies, in New
York State prisons. Though Eighth Amendment litigation will play a
role, it will work only when combined with strong grassroots
advocacy.
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INTRODUCTION
During the mid-1950s, amidst burgeoning awareness among social
justice activists of the abuse and neglect of individuals with mental
health needs in psychiatric hospitals, the number of individuals
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confined to those hospitals peaked.1 Five hundred and sixty thousand
patients were held in often brutal conditions, and scores of them were
denied access to basic necessities of life, such as the right to form and
maintain interpersonal relationships.2 Rather than simply accept such
severe restrictions upon their humanity, people who were confined to
institutions told their stories.3 Due chiefly to their courage and the
courage of their families and friends, a robust psychiatric
deinstitutionalization movement emerged.4 That movement—at its
peak during the 1960s and 1970s—forced psychiatric professionals,
state governments, and the federal government to reckon with a
treatment model that systematically devalued the lives of thousands
of people.5 Although many states shuttered large psychiatric
institutions in response to that movement, a large number of them—
including New York—failed to devote necessary resources to the
development of robust, community-based alternatives that could
provide psychiatric care.6 Because the creation of a community-based
care model, the chief goal of the deinstitutionalization movement, was
not actualized, some scholars consider the movement a failure.7
Furthermore, many of those in need who stood to benefit from the
movement wound up poor, destitute, or homeless as a result—
arguably not much better off than they were before.8

1. William H. Fisher et al., The Changing Role of the State Psychiatric Hospital,
28 HEALTH AFFAIRS 676, 676–78 (2009); see also Deanna Pan, Timeline:
Deinstitutionalization and Its Consequences, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/timeline-mental-health-america/
[https://perma.cc/5BQM-82RN] (describing population trends in psychiatric
hospitals).
2. Pan, supra note 1; see also Walid Fakhoury & Stefan Priebe,

Deinstitutionalization and Reinstitutionalization: Major Changes in the Provision of
Mental Health Care, 6 PSYCHIATRY 313, 313 (2007).
3. See Albert Q. Maisel, Bedlam 1946: Most U.S. Mental Hospitals Are a Shame
and a Disgrace, LIFE, May 6, 1946, at 102.
4. Deinstitutionalization: A Psychiatric “Titanic,” PBS FRONTLINE,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums/special/excerpt.html
[https://perma.cc/SH7S-HPXU].
5. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization
Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (discussing the successes and failures of
the psychiatric deinstitutionalization movement).
6. Editorial, Suffering in the Streets, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/09/16/opinion/suffering-streets-deinstitutionalization22-letter-mouthful-that-once-referred.html [https://perma.cc/6W65-WFJ4].
7. See Hitesh C. Sheth, Deinstitutionalization or Disowning Responsibility, 13
INT’L J. PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION 11, 11–21 (2009) (discussing the growth of
prisons and jails as de-facto mental health institutions due to a governmental failure
to devote adequate resources to deinstitutionalization).
8. Id.
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The “law and order” movement, which grew alongside the
deinstitutionalization movement, led to the increasingly draconian
criminalization of conduct often related to, or directly attributable to,
mental health needs.9 Driven largely by establishment politicians
increasingly buoyed by “tough on crime” rhetoric, the “law and
order” movement produced significant regressive legal reforms.10
One such example are New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, enacted
in 1973, which mandated harsher penalties for both the sale and
possession of small amounts of banned narcotics.11 The Rockefeller
Drug Laws and other state and federal laws enacted during the “law
and order” movement criminalized conduct often attributable to a
manifestation of mental health needs.12 For example, increased
criminalization of substance abuse disproportionately impacts
individuals with mental health needs, as over fifty percent of people

9. James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Criminalizing Mental Illness: The Story of
Adam Hall, SOLITARY WATCH (Mar. 14, 2012), http://solitarywatch.com/2012/05/14/
criminalizing-mental-illness-the-story-of-adam-hall/

[https://perma.cc/YV4S-ZJX4];

see also Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, Inside a Mental Hospital Called Jail, N.Y. TIMES

(Feb. 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/opinion/sunday/inside-a-mentalhospital-called-jail.html [https://nyti.ms/2jL2Om3] (discussing growth of prison and
jail mental health populations as a result of increasing arrests for “offenses that flow
from mental illness”).
10. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., THE GROWTH OF
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 336 (2014) (“Across all branches and levels
of government, the policies governing criminal processing and sentencing were
reformed to expand the use of incarceration. Prison time was increasingly required
for lesser offenses. Time served was significantly increased for violent crimes and for
repeat offenses. Drug crimes, particularly street dealing in urban areas, became
policed and punished more severely . . . . These changes in punishment policy—the
enactment of mandatory sentence laws, long sentences for violence and repeat
offenses, and intensified criminalization of drug-related activity—were the main and
proximate drivers of the growth in incarceration.”).
11. Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ’70s Drug Laws,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/nyregion/
26rockefeller.html [https://nyti.ms/2lpaxoR].
12. See Press Release, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, NYCLU Announces Findings
About Statewide Impact of Rockefeller Drug Laws (Mar. 11, 2009),
https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/nyclu-announces-findings-about-statewideimpact-rockefeller-drug-laws [https://perma.cc/E7ZE-VZEZ] (finding that “[m]any
of the thousands of New Yorkers in prison under these laws suffer from substance
abuse problems; many others struggle with issues related to homelessness, mental
illness or unemployment”). See generally Ellen Hochstedler Steury, Specifying
Criminalization of the Mentally Disordered Misdemeanant, 82 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 334 (1991) (discussing and specifying the definition of
“criminalization” in the context of offenses related to mental health needs).
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with mental health needs have a co-occurring and related substance
use disorder.13
The results of these two movements cohered. As the “law and
order” movement increasingly criminalized mental health-related
conduct, the deinstitutionalization movement failed to shield
individuals with mental health needs from the criminal justice system
because it did not create the type of robust treatment model shown to
prevent arrest and incarceration.14 Research has demonstrated that
the increase in individuals with mental health needs in jails and
prisons is directly correlated with the lack of mental health services
available in community settings.15 Left to fend for themselves
without access to robust treatment, individuals with mental health
needs were ever more imperiled by New York’s emergent “law and
order” ethos.16 That ethos’s harsh response to manifestations of
mental health-related conduct, combined with New York’s lack of
resources to treat such manifestations, led inexorably to an increase in
the incarceration rate of individuals with mental health needs over
several decades.17 Between 1991 and 2002, the percentage of
13. See B.C. Div., Criminalization of Mental Illness, CAN. MENTAL HEALTH
ASS’N (Mar. 2005), http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archipsy/CMHA_march2005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/49FE-XXWU] (“For a minority of people, usually those with
multiple complex needs, deinstitutionalization combined with a lack of
comprehensive community support systems has resulted in another type of
‘institutionalization,’ with prisons and jails rather than hospitals. This is only one of
the factors leading to an increase in what is generally known as the ‘criminalization of
mental illness,’ i.e. where a criminal, legal response overtakes a medical response to
behaviour related to mental illness . . . . Over 50% of people with mental illness have
a co-occurring substance abuse disorder. Co-occurring disorders (mental illness and
substance use disorder) are more difficult to treat than either mental illness or
substance abuse alone, and there are insufficient treatment programs for the growing
demand.”).
14. Access to Mental Health Care and Incarceration, MENTAL HEALTH AM.,
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/issues/access-mental-health-care-andincarceration [https://perma.cc/Z5QX-KKH7] (“In 2015, the Sentencing Project
ranked the states based on the number of people incarcerated in state prison per
100,000 residents. Comparing state-by-state rates of incarceration with the access to
mental health care ranking show a strong positive correlation between rates of
adult[s] who are in the criminal justice system and lack of access to mental health
care.”).
15. Id.
16. See discussion infra Part I.
17. E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., THE TREATMENT
OF PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN PRISONS AND JAILS: A STATE SURVEY 73
(2014),
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/treatmentbehind-bars/treatment-behind-bars.pdf [https://perma.cc/WY77-24N3] (“As the state
mental hospitals have been downsized and closed, there has been a concomitant
increase in mentally ill persons in the county jails and state prisons . . . . The state’s
prisons, by default, have taken the place of psychiatric centers.”).
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individuals receiving active mental health treatment in in New York
prisons increased by 73%.18 Over that same time period, the overall
prison population increased by 14.6%.19 The increase in those
incarcerated with mental health needs was five times greater than the
increase in the overall prison population.20 As recently as 2012, onequarter of incarcerated individuals nationwide were diagnosed with
mental health needs.21 These trends, along with a lack of fiscal
resources, have burdened Central New York Psychiatric Center
(“CNYPC”), the New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”)
forensic hospital that is responsible for corrections-based mental
health treatment in New York State prisons.22 The predicament at
the CNYPC is a reflection of a nationwide crisis.23
Activists, advocates, and lawyers have played a major role in
responding to this crisis and improving psychiatric treatment in New
York’s prisons over the last several decades.24 For example, lawyers
from Disability Advocates, Inc., Prisoners’ Legal Services of New
York, and the Prisoners’ Rights Project of The Legal Aid Society of
New York City negotiated a private settlement agreement in

Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental
Health,25 expanding the circumscribed mental health services options
in New York State prisons and increasing services for people with
serious mental health needs housed in twenty-three-hour-per-day
solitary confinement.26 Although that settlement agreement has since
expired, it led to the implementation of the Special Housing Unit

18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 19 (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q26F-CQHJ].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Robert D. Morgan et al., Treating Offenders with Mental Illness: A Research
Synthesis, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 37 (2012).
22. MARY BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA: THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL 193 (2007).
23. Morgan et al., supra note 21, at 37 (“[T]reatment efforts for offenders with
mental illness have been unable to keep pace with the incarceration rates in state and
federal jail and prison facilities. In fact, the U.S. correctional systems have been
criticized for failing to provide even minimally appropriate mental health services for
prison inmates.”).
24. See discussion infra Parts I and II.
25. See generally Private Settlement Agreement, Disability Advocates, Inc. v.
N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, No. 02 Civ. 4002 (GEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter Private Settlement Agreement].
26. Id.
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(“SHU”) Exclusion Law,27 a New York State law that codified the
expansion of treatment options and units for incarcerated individuals
with serious mental health needs.28 Among other requirements, the
SHU Exclusion Law requires the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)—the agency
that operates all New York State prisons—to “divert or remove
inmates with serious mental illness . . . from [twenty-three-hour-perday solitary confinement] when the period of [solitary confinement]
could potentially be [longer than] thirty days.”29 As a result, people
with serious mental health needs—who, studies show, are far more
susceptible to mental deterioration in solitary confinement—are
diverted to a more treatment-rich environment.30 Apart from the
SHU Exclusion Law, the Constitution mandates that DOCCS and
OMH provide mental health treatment to all other individuals with
serious mental health needs, including mental health assessments by
trained clinicians.31

27. Provisions of the law are codified as amendments to N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 553.24
(McKinney 2017) and N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 2, 137.6, 401, 401-a (McKinney 2017).
28. See generally sources cited supra note 27.
29. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(i).
30. See discussion infra Part I; see also Fatos Kaba et al., Solitary Confinement
and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 442, 445 (2014)
(finding that people who were punished by solitary confinement were approximately
6.9 times as likely to commit acts of self-harm); Joshua Manson, New Report
Documents Devastating Effects of Solitary Confinement on Mental Illness,
SOLITARY WATCH (Sept. 9, 2016), http://solitarywatch.com/2016/09/09/new-reportdocuments-devastating-effects-of-solitary-confinement-on-mental-illness/
[https://perma.cc/3LJT-J9UU] (explaining solitary confinement’s acute impact upon
individuals with preexisting mental health needs).
31. See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (2015). See also Brown v.
Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (upholding a lower court population cap order under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act based in part on California’s longstanding
unconstitutional failure to provide needed mental health treatment and “specifically
the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate
provision of medical and mental health care”). Prior to Plata, courts assumed that
psychiatric care was included in medical care for Eighth Amendment purposes, but
the issue had not been addressed at the Supreme Court level. See Langley v.
Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that “psychiatric or mental health
care is an integral part of medical care. It thus falls within the requirement of Estelle
v. Gamble that it must be provided to prisoners. The difference between the two
varieties of care are simply factual and administrative”); see also Eng v. Smith, 849
F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding preliminary injunction on Eighth Amendment
claim based on deliberate indifference to mental health treatment needs); Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that there was “no underlying
distinction between the right to medical care for physical ills and its psychological or
psychiatric counterpart”). Courts have since distinguished between “serious medical
needs” and “serious mental health needs” for the purpose of Eighth Amendment
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A memorandum of understanding between DOCCS and OMH
details how the agencies work together to serve the needs of the
population.32 Services are delivered primarily through mental health
satellite units, which are units within the prisons providing mental
health treatment.33 Each satellite unit is headed by a mental health
unit chief and is additionally staffed by nurses, social workers, and
psychiatrists.34
Almost all New York State prisons with mental health satellite
units support local economies and serve as economic anchor
institutions in fiscally depressed communities far from New York
City’s population center.35 These prisons provide well-paying jobs in
communities without many other employment options and maintain
generational wealth through retirement packages and union
protections.36 Although a boon to local economies, the location of
these prisons and the satellite units in them—specifically their
geographic isolation—has negatively affected the quality of mental
health care provided to incarcerated people.37 For years, rural and
suburban New York counties have experienced psychiatrist shortages:

deliberate indifference claims. For more on that distinction, see discussion on the
Eighth Amendment framework infra Part II.
32. See generally Memorandum of Understanding between the New York State
Office of Mental Health and the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Understanding] (on file with author).
33. Id. at 3–4. See generally N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive
# 4301: Mental Health Satellite Services and Commitments to CNYPC (Aug. 18,
2015) [hereinafter DOCCS Directive # 4301] (on file with author).
34. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 32, at 7–8.
35. See, e.g., Ken Stier, NYS Prison Budget Climbs, Despite Fewer Inmates, CITY
LIMITS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://citylimits.org/2015/11/10/nys-prison-budget-climbsdespite-fewer-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/C6L7-3A2W] (“‘These are great, living-wage
jobs in an area like Ogdensburg, in an area like Lyon Mountain, in an area like Lake
Saranac,’ exclaims Mike Powers, president of the New York State Correctional
Officer and Police Benevolent Association (NYSCOPBA), which represents 26,000
officers and retirees, most of whom live upstate, about or around the New York
Thruway where there are few other well-paid jobs not requiring higher education
levels. He makes no apology for aggressively working to retain as many of those
posts as possible.”). Only two of New York’s fifteen prison units for individuals with
serious mental illness are located in the New York City region. Almost all of the
remaining thirteen units are located in rural areas with physician shortages. See
discussion infra Part II.
36. See Stier, supra note 35.
37. See Joel A. Dvoskin et al., The Structure of Correctional Mental Health
Services, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 489, 496 (Richard
Rosner ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“Complications surrounding geographic isolation and
limited access to mental health professionals familiar with the correctional setting
may, at times, compromise care for inmates.”).
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for example, in 2017, fifty-four of sixty-two counties in the state
reported shortages.38 As such, the prison mental health satellite units
in certain rural regions of New York State are under-staffed because
DOCCS and OMH have difficulty hiring mental health clinicians in
under-resourced, remote parts of the state that are experiencing those
shortages.39
Due to the dearth of qualified mental health clinicians in rural
communities, DOCCS and OMH extensively utilize a video
teleconferencing (“VTC”) model40 for the provision of outpatient
mental health services in many of the satellite units.41 Psychiatrists
assess individuals through VTC to determine whether individuals who
have reported a mental health crisis should be removed from suicide
watch or discharged from an observation cell.42
Individuals
incarcerated in New York State prisons are often assessed for their
mental health condition—and even for their suicide risk—via VTC.43
Individuals who receive ongoing mental health services, known as
“being on the OMH case load,” also receive treatment from
psychiatrists via VTC.44 That treatment includes regular VTC
appointments with individuals for the purpose of assessing mental
health status, evaluating treatment regimens, and determining
whether medications need to be adjusted.45 Many correctional
agencies throughout the nation have championed VTC as a method
of responding to resource issues.46

38. UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., REGENTS DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN SHORTAGE
AREAS IN NEW YORK STATE 3–15 (2017).
39. Id. at 22.
40. “VTC” is often referred to in a mental health context as “telepsychiatry,”
“telepsych,” or “tele-mental health.” For the purposes of this Article, “VTC”
encompasses all these terms.
41. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 32, at 7 (“In OMH Level 1
Satellite Units, there is a full time Unit Chief/Coordinator, and clinical staff working
on site Monday through Friday sufficient to meet the needs of the mental health
caseload. Under normal conditions there will be full time psychiatric coverage, by a
psychiatrist or psychiatric nurse practitioner, either on site or by video
teleconferencing.”).
42. See Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 4.2:
Suicide Watches 1–2 (June 1, 2016) (on file with author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr.,
Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 2.9: Psychiatric Evaluation and Treatment via
Video Tele-Conference (VTC) 1–2 (June 2016) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 2.9] (on
file with author).
43. CBO Policy # 2.9, supra note 42, at 1–2.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Michael Ollove, State Prisons Turn to Telemedicine to Improve Health and
Save Money, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE BLOG (Jan. 21, 2016),
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Due to the geographic isolation of prisons and the resulting dearth
of adequate local psychiatric services, DOCCS and OMH rely too
heavily on VTC at the expense of the mental health of incarcerated
persons. VTC is best suited to supplement, not supplant, in-person
mental health services; it has been criticized as an ineffective medium
for establishing trust and efficacy between clinicians and patients, and
assessments performed by VTC may be unreliable or perfunctory.47
Unfortunately, DOCCS and OMH have, in some cases, used it as a
primary vehicle for the provision of mental health services in many
state prisons, exacerbating the geographic isolation and psychosocial
burden upon individuals with mental health needs incarcerated in
those prisons.48 Overreliance on VTC is merely one symptom of an
overburdened prison mental health delivery system based in locations
without sufficient resources.
Mental health treatment provided in New York State prisons will
continue to suffer so long as prisons are sited in geographically
isolated areas of the state. Unfortunately, decision makers in
DOCCS, OMH, the governor’s office, and the State Legislature have
not acknowledged that reality. Geographic isolation and resulting
resource issues are virtual non-factors in New York’s discourse
around prison siting and prison closures. That omission reveals
gubernatorial, legislative, and agency priorities—state actors have
prioritized supporting rural economies over tackling the geographic

http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/01/21/stateprisons-turn-to-telemedicine-to-improve [https://perma.cc/UZK3-WDNX].
47. See, e.g., Donald M. Hilty et al., Clinical and Educational Telepsychiatry
Applications: A Review, 49 CAN. J. PSYCH. 12, 16 (2004) (finding that “[c]onsultee
(that is, nurse, psychologist, or other) satisfaction with telepsychiatry was lower than
satisfaction with in-person consultation in terms of ease with the process, ability to
express oneself, and quality of interpersonal relationships . . . . One concern with
telemedicine is that the technology may adversely affect communication and the
development of a positive therapeutic alliance. Decreased ability to detect nonverbal
cues in patient interviews has been reported during videoconferencing, which may
limit mutual connections and understanding.
In a physical environment,
informational cues are incorporated without conscious awareness . . . the virtual
environment created by telemedicine may differ . . . ”); see also Jeannine Monnier et
al., Recent Advances in Telepsychiatry: An Updated Review, 54 PSYCH. SERVS. 1604,
1607 (2003) (citing studies that find that “telepsychiatric methods are not appealing
to those providing treatment because these methods are perceived to make
communication difficult and interfere with the therapeutic relationship”).
48. See Joseph Berger, In Sing Sing’s Hometown, Many Dream of Day ‘the Big
House’ Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/
nyregion/in-sing-sings-hometown-dreams-of-inmates-leaving-for-good.html
[https://nyti.ms/2yCxiLk] (noting that New York City-based lawmakers and
advocates have emphasized the need for incarcerated individuals to maintain family
ties, a problem when prisons are located “hundreds of miles away”).
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issue that stands in the way of delivering robust mental health
treatment to incarcerated individuals. This is a stark choice given the
studies that find a lower recidivism rate among those who receive
treatment while incarcerated.49
Governor Cuomo has initiated the closure of minimum- and
medium-security prisons to address budget issues, but has never
proposed closing a large, maximum-security prison with a mental
health satellite unit to address the failure of mental health treatment
in such facilities.50 His administration has never proposed moving
mental health satellite units to better-resourced areas of the state to
foster the provision of more robust, in-person mental health
treatment. This omission is almost certainly not attributable to lack
of knowledge on Governor Cuomo’s part, as one of his most prized
executive agencies, the New York Justice Center for the Protection of
People with Special Needs, has decried the poor mental health
treatment in New York’s prisons and attributed that poor treatment
to resources deficiencies.51 Governor Cuomo’s omission may be due,
in part, to pushback from state lawmakers. When Governor Cuomo
decided to close minimum- and medium-security prisons in rural
areas of the state, lawmakers responded by assailing the governor for
one potential result—loss of jobs and damage to the local economy.52
It is safe to assume that the governor would face more vigorous
pushback against any proposal to close a maximum-security prison, as

49. Morgan et al., supra note 21, at 37.
50. Id.
51. Governor Cuomo created the New York Justice Center for the Protection of
People with Special Needs in response to federal government findings that its
predecessor, the New York State Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilities, was inadequate. Press Release, Office of the Governor,
Governor Cuomo Announces Opening of the Justice Center for the Protection of
People with Special Needs (June 29, 2013), https://www.governor.ny.gov/
news/governor-cuomo-announces-opening-justice-center-protection-people-specialneeds [https://perma.cc/4RKA-2RMJ]. The Justice Center has since found that
DOCCS and OMH have failed to provide robust care to people with mental health
needs incarcerated in state prisons, in part due to resources issues. See discussion
infra Part II.
52. State Senator Betty Little has often complained about job loss due to prison
closures. See, e.g., Paul Post, Closed Prisons in Rural Areas Are a Tough Sell, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/nyregion/closed-prisonsnew-york.html [https://nyti.ms/2ojPfMl] (“When the decision is made to close a
prison in a rural community, that community loses hundreds of jobs that aren’t going
to be absorbed by the private sector . . . . It’s a huge blow that someone from a
populated area of New York State wouldn’t understand.”).
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such facilities are larger than minimum- and medium-security
facilities and provide greater economic benefits.53
The political paradigm therefore remains. The discourse around
prison closures and prison siting in New York State remains intensely
focused on the needs of small, rural communities rather than the
needs of incarcerated individuals, particularly those with mental
health needs. The conversation has steadfastly omitted difficulties
recruiting and retaining mental health staff to meet the needs of
incarcerated individuals in those rural communities, and the resulting
impact on rehabilitation. Advocacy organizations such as the
Correctional Association of New York and the Alliance of Families
for Justice have repeatedly called for the closure of large prisons in
rural areas and the re-directing of resources to facilities closer to large
population centers where more humane treatment is feasible.54 This
Article argues that due to the convergence of the above-mentioned
social phenomena, this is the only way to improve mental health
treatment in New York State prisons.
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the
deinstitutionalization movement and its impact upon the
development of an infrastructure for psychiatric care in the New York
State prison system. Part I also evaluates the effectiveness of that
system’s use of VTC as a response to resource and geographic issues
affecting the quality of psychiatric care. Part II provides an overview
of the dearth of Eighth Amendment litigation involving VTC, and
posits that Eighth Amendment litigation is an inadequate vehicle
through which to address VTC and other resource problems
attendant to the provision of mental health treatment in rural prisons.
Part III argues that, in addition to any litigation strategy, activists,
advocates, and movement lawyers must build on an already existing
grassroots movement to shrink the prison population and shift
psychiatric resources and incarcerated persons in need of such
resources to facilities near urban centers. The widespread use of

53. But cf. DANA KAPLAN, IMPACTS OF JAIL EXPANSION IN NEW YORK STATE: A
HIDDEN BURDEN 1 (2007) https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/ImpactsofJail
Expansion_NYS.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NSS-JSSC] (explaining the costs of prison
construction as opposed to the economic benefits borne by the communities in which
prisons are located).
54. Current
Topic:
Close
Attica,
CORR.
ASS’N
OF
N.Y.,
http://www.correctionalassociation.org/current_topics/attica [https://perma.cc/7ABPELX4]; March for Justice: From New York City to Albany!, ALL. OF FAMILIES FOR
JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2017), https://afj-ny.org/blog/2017/4/27/march-for-justice-fromharlem-to-state-house-in-albany [https://perma.cc/C9T6-Q25W].
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VTC in prisons is reflective of a fundamental geographic problem
and, as such, requires a geographic solution.
I. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION AND RESULTING DEFICIENCIES IN
NEW YORK’S PRISON MENTAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
As explained above, the deinstitutionalization and “law and order”
movements unintentionally caused a large increase in the number of
individuals with mental health needs in prisons. In response to that
increase, DOCCS and OMH have changed their corrections-based
mental health treatment modalities and increased the number of
prison-based units that provide mental health treatment.55 Despite
those changes, need has far outstripped resources.56 As a result,
DOCCS and OMH rely heavily on VTC.57 Part I provides an
overview of the results of the deinstitutionalization movement,58 the
subsequent changes in DOCCS and OMH’s mental health care
delivery system,59 and an explanation of DOCCS and OMH’s use of
VTC.60 Part I ultimately concludes that deficiencies in VTC have
combined with other factors to cause poor outcomes for people with
mental health needs. Due to VTC’s deficiencies, DOCCS and OMH
should not rely on VTC to improve mental health treatment in state
prisons. That improvement will come only after the agencies reckon
with underlying geographic and resources problems.
A. An Abridged History of the Deinstitutionalization Movement
Though many critics consider the deinstitutionalization movement
to have been a “disaster” because of its inability to achieve more
robust community integration of individuals with mental health
needs, the facts paint a far more complicated picture.61 The
deinstitutionalization movement was certainly a partial success in that
it caused a drastic decrease in the number of individuals with mental
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See discussion infra Section I.B.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
See discussion infra Section I.A.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
See discussion infra Section I.B.
See generally E. FULLER TORREY, OUT

OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING
AMERICA’S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS (1998) (identifying systemic flaws in America’s
mental health treatment model and linking those flaws to failures of the
deinstitutionalization movement); Amitai Etzioni, “Deinstitutionalization”: A Public
Policy Fashion, 3 EVALUATION, no. 2, 1976, at 9; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing

Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in
the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 54 (2011).
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health needs confined to institutional settings.62 In 1955, the number
of individuals in large psychiatric hospitals peaked at approximately
560,000 individuals.63 As of 2012, that number had dropped to
approximately 50,400, around nine percent of what it was at its peak,
and continued to drop.64 This was a great achievement, as it removed
individuals from dilapidated and under-resourced facilities to, in some
cases, community alternatives.65
However, deinstitutionalization also came at a cost to some
individuals with mental health needs. The overriding criticism of the
deinstitutionalization movement focuses on its incompleteness.66
Although deinstitutionalization brought down the raw number of
individuals with serious mental health needs confined to institutions,
it also shifted a significant portion of that population onto the streets
and into jails and prisons, due largely to an increase in arrests for
manifestations of mental health needs.67 As Professor Bagenstos
writes, “there is . . . little doubt that, in the wake of
deinstitutionalization, a significant number of people were left to fend
for themselves.”68 As a result, today nearly fifteen percent of men
and thirty percent of women booked into jails nationwide have a
serious mental health need.69
62. Fisher et al., supra note 1, at 676 (“State hospitals were once the most
prominent components of U.S. public mental health systems. But a major focus of
mental health policy over the past fifty years has been to close these facilities. These
efforts led to a 95 percent reduction in the country’s state hospital population.”).
63. See TORREY, supra note 61, at 9; Harcourt, supra note 61, at 54.
64. See TORREY, supra note 61, at 9; Harcourt, supra note 61, at 54.
65. See generally Ronald W. Manderscheid et al., Changing Trends in State
Psychiatric Hospital Use from 2002 to 2005, 60 PSYCH. SERVS. 29 (2009).
66. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 3; Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 HOUS. L.
REV. 63, 94–97 (1991).
67. BRENDAN O’FLAHERTY, MAKING ROOM: THE ECONOMICS OF HOMELESSNESS
235 (1998) (“After 1975, the movement out of state and county mental hospitals was
more than offset by the movement into nursing homes and correctional institutions,
and after 1980 homelessness rose among mentally ill because housing conditions got
worse.”); E. Fuller Torrey, Jails and Prisons—America’s New Mental Hospitals,
85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1611, 1611 (1995) (“Quietly but steadily, jails and prisons are
replacing public mental hospitals as the primary purveyors of public psychiatric
services for individuals with serious mental illnesses in the United States.”); Jailing
People with Mental Illness, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/
Learn-More/Public-Policy/Jailing-People-with-Mental-Illness [https://perma.cc/7S8EZYFP] (“In a mental health crisis, people are more likely to encounter police than
get medical help. As a result, 2 million people with mental illness are booked into
jails each year. Nearly 15% of men and 30% of women booked into jails have a
serious mental health condition.”).
68. Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 3.
69. Jailing People with Mental Illness, supra note 67.
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The movement’s failure to achieve more robust community
integration rather than a shift in the type of institutionalization was
not driven by flawed movement strategies and tactics. Instead, it was
driven by the failure of the federal government and local and state
governments to devote the necessary resources to establishing a true
community-based treatment model for individuals with serious
mental health needs.70 Many of the programs that benefited
individuals with mental health needs, most notably those authorized
specifically to effectuate deinstitutionalization, were not fully
implemented or were entirely eliminated under a succession of
several presidential administrations. In some cases, the executive
branch scuttled those programs by failing to spend the monies
Congress authorized to fund them.
The Nixon Administration, for example, refused to expend $289.5
million of the $340 million authorized to support community mental
health centers and mental health research initiatives between 1970
and 1973.71 That funding had been authorized as an extension of, and
an amendment to, the Community Mental Health Act of 1963.72
President Ford, after succeeding President Nixon in scandal, vetoed
an expansion of that Act.73 That veto was later overridden74 and
although the law survived under President Carter after two
reauthorizations, expenditures remained meager.75

70. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 20.
71. James M. Cameron, A National Community Mental Health Program: Policy
Inflation and Progress, in HANDBOOK ON MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 121 (David A. Rochefort ed., 1989). Prior to Congress’s passage of the
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 601–688, and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of that Act in Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35
(1976), presidents maintained virtually unbridled authority to impound—or refuse to
spend—monies appropriated by Congress. President Nixon impounded with
impunity. See generally Gerald A. Figurski, Presidential Impoundment of Funds: A
Constitutional Crisis, 7 AKRON L. REV. 107 (1974). Presidents now maintain a
circumscribed power to interfere with the executive branch’s expenditure of
appropriated funds. Some scholars maintain that such interference runs afoul of the
Constitution’s “Take Care Clause.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. For a more robust
explanation of the presidential power, as it exists today, to interfere with
expenditures, see generally David E. Lewis, Political Control and the Presidential
Spending Power (Vanderbilt Univ. Ctr. Study of Democratic Insts., Working Paper
No. 1, 2017), https://www.vanderbilt.edu/csdi/includes/WP_1_2017_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JJ9-AJSH].
72. See generally Community Mental Health Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77
Stat. 282 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
73. Health Bill OKd in Congress: Ford Veto Is Upset 1st Time in ‘75, CHI.
TRIBUNE, July 30, 1975, at 6.
74. Id.
75. See generally id.
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After President Carter’s Commission on Mental Health produced a
preliminary and later final report that nominally supported
deinstitutionalization,76 Congress passed another law, the Mental
Health Systems Act of 1980, to support such efforts.77 That law was
never implemented, however, as Congress largely repealed it during
the heady early days of the Reagan Administration.78 In the bill
repealing the Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, Congress also
block-granted to the states the remaining money authorized by the
Community Mental Health Act of 1963, thus transferring
responsibility for the implementation of mental health services and
programming to state governments.79 Over the next decade, most
states developed what are best termed “minimum benefit mental
health [programs],”80 and passed legislation—most of which was not
ambitious—to fund only basic necessities for individuals with mental
health needs.81 Most of the community mental health centers
authorized by Congress were never built.82

76. Gerald N. Grob, Public Policy and Mental Illnesses: Jimmy Carter’s
Presidential Commission on Mental Health, 83 MILBANK Q. 425, 442 (2005) (“The

report affirmed a commitment to the goal of making high-quality mental health care
at reasonable cost available to all who needed it. Personal and community supports
had to be strengthened, and a responsible mental health service system had to be
created that provided the most appropriate care in a least restrictive setting. The
report endorsed a federal program designed to encourage the creation of new
community mental health services, particularly in underserved areas.”).
77. See generally The Mental Health Systems Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-398
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (repealed 1981).
78. See generally The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
79. See Cameron, supra note 71, at 121. This was but one tactic in the Reagan
Administration’s new federalism/devolution strategy, which initiated a swift and
radical transfer of power from the federal government to state governments. New
federalism/devolution, which was based on an overbroad reading of the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, unsurprisingly harmed traditionally
marginalized groups that relied on federal government intervention to secure basic
civil rights. For an illustration of the manner in which “new federalism” harmed
traditionally marginalized groups, specifically African-Americans, the working class,
and the poor, see generally Anthony Cook, The Ghosts of 1964: Race, Reagan, and
the Neo-Conservative Backlash to the Civil Rights Movement, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L.
REV. 81 (2015).
80. Olga Loraine Kofman, Deinstitutionalization and Its Discontents: American
Mental Health Policy Reform 38 (2012) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Claremont
McKenna College), http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1348
&context=cmc_theses [https://perma.cc/JS74-9ERH].
81. Id. at 33.
82. See generally Michelle R. Smith, 50 Years Later, Kennedy’s Vision for Mental
Health Not Realized, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.seattletimes.com/
nation-world/50-years-later-kennedyrsquos-vision-for-mental-health-not-realized/
[https://perma.cc/B4T7-DVYX].
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Between this shift of responsibility to the states and cuts to
preexisting social safety net programs during the 1980s and 1990s, the
federal government essentially abdicated its role in promoting
community integration.83 Not until the 1990s and the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) were individuals with
mental health needs the focus of any major federal legislative
efforts.84 Even then, the ADA is largely rights-based, not servicesbased.85 In 1990, the Public Citizen Health Research Group and the
National Alliance for the Mentally Ill conducted a nationwide study
and found that public psychiatric services were in “near total
breakdown,” both underfunded and understaffed.86
Left with the major responsibility, state governments did little.87
New York is very much a microcosm of the national trend away from
confining individuals with serious mental health needs to psychiatric
83. See Michael L. Perlin, Book Reviews, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 557, 568
(1991).
84. See generally SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF POLICY, TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL
SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME DISABILITY PROGRAMS 73–81
(2006), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/disability_trends/trends.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W3ST-BFLG].
85. A rights-based statute, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), is one that
guarantees a group’s basic civil legal rights. The Americans with Disabilities Act
fulfilled that function for people with disabilities. See generally An Overview of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (2017), https://adata.org/
sites/adata.org/files/files/ADA_overview_final2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUT5-625U].
Because of the ADA, people with disabilities can access services and public
accommodations to which non-disabled people have always had access. By contrast,
a services-based statute, like the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, provides an
entitlement to, or appropriates funds for, a service for a marginalized group. In the
case of the Community Mental Health Act of 1963, those services were community
health centers. Rights-based statutes create legal parity between traditionally
marginalized groups and their privileged counterparts. Services-based statutes, by
contrast, expand entitlements in an affirmative attempt at equity. As such, they are
usually more ambitious.
86. See Phillip J. Hilts, U.S. Returns to 1820’s in Care of Mentally Ill, Study
Asserts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/12/us/usreturns-to-1820-s-in-care-of-mentally-ill-study-asserts.html [https://perma.cc/F29D9NCL].
87. Kofman, supra note 80, at 32 (“States were not pleased to support mental
health programs and little more than custodial care was provided. Major gaps in
service were never addressed, particularly the lack of rehabilitative and aftercare
services for the chronically mentally ill. Poor coordination between state hospitals
and community mental health centers also made continuous care for the chronically
mentally ill patchy at best. Worse yet, states divested themselves of responsibility for
the mentally ill by transferring patients to private nursing homes or board-and-care
facilities away from state facilities as a result of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
and Medicaid offering financial support . . . . The seriously mentally disabled were
quietly ignored . . . .”).
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institutions and toward confining them in prisons.88 As a result of a
great increase in the sheer numbers of individuals incarcerated in the
state of New York throughout the 1980s and 1990s,89 and the number
of those individuals who came into the system with mental health
needs,90 DOCCS bolstered its mental health services system.91 That
shift occurred in part so that DOCCS and OMH could avoid Eighth
Amendment92 or medical malpractice liability for the failure to
provide those individuals with constitutionally mandated medical—
and now mental health—treatment.93 The shift mirrored similar shifts
in the medical care priorities of corrections agencies across the
country.94
B.

The Scope of the System and the Availability of Mental Health
Treatment in New York State Prisons

Integral to understanding the way that geographic factors and lack
of resources have undermined the efficacy of mental health treatment
in New York State prisons is understanding the full scope of the
system and the nature of the programs and therapy it provides.
Mental health treatment in DOCCS is provided by OMH through
CNYPC, which provides inpatient treatment at its hospital in Marcy,
All
New York, and outpatient treatment at state prisons.95
88. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 19. See generally KACEY
HEEKIN & LARRY POLIVKA, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MENTAL HEALTH
(2015), http://coss.fsu.edu/subdomains/claudepeppercenter.fsu.edu_wp/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/The-Criminal-Justice-System-and-Mental-Health.pdf
[https://perma.cc/569N-F2H4]; Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, For Mentally Ill
Inmates at Rikers Island, a Cycle of Jail and Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/12/nyregion/for-mentally-ill-inmates-at-rikers-acycle-of-jail-and-hospitals.html [https://nyti.ms/2jBuiYF].
89. See discussion supra Introduction.
90. See discussion supra Introduction.
91. Lisa W. Foderaro, The Mentally Ill Overwhelm New York’s Prisons,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/06/us/the-mentally-illoverwhelm-new-york-s-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/3G3H-ULFF].
92. For a fuller explanation of the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to prison
mental health care, see discussion infra Section II.A.
93. See, e.g., Stipulation, Eng v. Goord, No. 80 Civ. 385S (W.D.N.Y. June 12,
2000) (barring DOCCS and OMH from placing individuals with serious mental
illness in solitary confinement at certain state prisons and mandating procedures for
assessing suicide risk and guaranteeing quality of mental health treatment).
94. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CALLOUS AND CRUEL: USE OF FORCE
AGAINST INMATES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES IN US JAILS AND PRISONS (2015),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisoner0515_ForUpload.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T5M8-YQYL] (discussing the evolution of the provision of mental
health care in United States prisons and the quality of that care).
95. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 32, at 10–12.
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incarcerated individuals are screened for mental health treatment
needs as part of the DOCCS reception process.96 Incarcerated
individuals can also request mental health services during their
incarceration, though many complain that those requests are not
always met.97 Where necessary, incarcerated individuals can be
voluntarily or involuntarily transferred from a state prison to
CNYPC.98 Involuntary commitment to a hospital occurs through the
“two physician certificate” process outlined in New York Mental
Hygiene Law section 9.27.99 OMH also utilizes an emergency
admissions procedure where a patient is an imminent danger to
themselves or others and therefore requires a heightened level of care
in shorter order than is feasible through the “two physician
certificate” process.100
Each individual whom OMH and DOCCS have identified as
requiring mental health treatment at reception or during some other
point in their incarceration is designated a mental health “service
level” pursuant to OMH policy.101 OMH can change this service level
based upon the person’s acuity, or severity of their symptoms.102
There are five OMH service levels—one, two, three, four, and six.103
A person designated service level six has been identified as “not in
96. Id. at 10; see also Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations
Policy # 1.2: Reception Mental Health Screening 1–3 (Apr. 8, 2015) (on file with
author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 2.0:
Screened – Admitted to Services 1–3 (June 1, 2016) (on file with author).
97. See DOCCS Directive # 4301, supra note 33, at 3–5; N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. &
Cmty. Supervision, Form # 3150: Mental Health Referral (July 2016) (on file with
author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 1.3:
Mental Health Referrals 1–2 (May 20, 2016) (on file with author).
98. See DOCCS Directive # 4301, supra note 33, at 9–10.
99. See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 2017).
100. Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 7.4:
Admissions to Inpatient Services 1, 4–5 (May 13, 2014) (on file with author). In the
emergency procedure, where a patient is “mentally ill and dangerous to self or others
and requires immediate transfer to an inpatient facility,” the two physician certificate
process proceeds, but without the court order requirement imposed under normal
circumstances. Id.; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 2017); N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 402 (McKinney 2017).
101. See Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 1.12:
Mental Health Service Level 1 (May 20, 2016) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 1.12] (on
file with author); Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Treatment Needs/Service Level
Designation (Outpatient) 167 MED CNYPC (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter MED
CNYPC] (on file with author).
102. See CBO Policy # 1.12, supra note 101, at 1; Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr.,
Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 9.12: Treatment Needs/Service Level
Designation Form 1–3 (May 6, 2015) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 9.12] (on file with
author); MED CNYPC, supra note 101.
103. CBO Policy # 9.12, supra note 102, at 1–3.
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need of services” and is therefore not on the OMH case load.104 An
individual who has been designated service level one is considered in
highest need of treatment.105 Individuals with serious mental health
needs, as defined in New York state law as opposed to simply OMH
policy, receive a 1-S or 2-S designation (referred to as “Sdesignation”).106
OMH also assigns each state prison a service level, which denotes
the number and type of OMH staff and clinical space available to
meet the treatment needs of incarcerated individuals.107 Because not
every prison has the staff or resources to serve high-need individuals,
those individuals with a service level one, two, three, or four, or an Sdesignation may only be housed at prisons with a corresponding
service level.108 In practice, this means that individuals with an Sdesignation cannot be housed at a level three facility, because such
facility does not have the necessary resources to treat that
individual.109
In addition to affording specified treatment to individuals based
upon their particular service level, DOCCS and OMH afford certain
people access to specialized units in which more intensive mental
health treatment is provided.110
Those units grew out of a
combination of forward-thinking action by DOCCS and OMH,
litigation, legislation, and grassroots mobilization by advocates and
activists.111 Such a specialized unit that serves individuals with serious
104. CBO Policy # 1.12, supra note 101, at 1.
105. CBO Policy # 9.12, supra note 102, at 1–3.
106. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(6)(d)–(e) (McKinney 2017). State law defines
persons with “serious mental illness” as “individuals who meet criteria established by
the commissioner of mental health, which shall include persons who are in psychiatric
crisis, or persons who have a designated diagnosis of mental illness under the most
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and
whose severity and duration of mental illness results in substantial functional
disability.” N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 1.03(52) (McKinney 2017); see also Cent. N.Y.
Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 1.13: Serious Mental Illness
Designation 1–5 (Mar. 16, 2015) (on file with author).
107. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive # 4302: Transfers to
Health/Mental Health Care Units 7 (May 9, 2017) [hereinafter DOCCS Directive
# 4302] (on file with author); see also CBO Policy # 1.12, supra note 101, at 1.
108. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 7.
109. See id. (noting that individuals are “assigned to facilities where that level of
service is available”).
110. Id. at 4–6.
111. For example, in 2016, DOCCS and OMH expanded treatment options for
people with histories of mental health-related violence of their own volition, rather
than in response to litigation. For more information on those units, see discussion
concerning the Discharge and Enhanced Intermediate Care Programs infra
Section I.B. As mentioned above, however, DOCCS and OMH did not expand
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mental health needs is called a Residential Mental Health Treatment
Unit (“RMHTU”).112 The RMHTUs are organized into two types.
The first type of RMHTU serves individuals who would otherwise be
housed in general population, or those who do not have solitary
confinement sanctions of any type.113 Those units are called the
Intermediate Care Program,114 Transitional Intermediate Care
treatment options for people with S-designations housed in solitary confinement until
it settled civil rights litigation. See Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25, at 3–
7. DOCCS and OMH did not make many of those options permanent until the SHU
Exclusion Law was codified. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 553.24 (McKinney 2017); N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW §§ 2, 137.6, 401 & 401-a (McKinney 2017). The SHU Exclusion Law
was codified largely due to advocacy by Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary
Confinement, a grassroots advocacy organization dedicated to the development of
therapeutic approaches to mental health crises in the DOCCS system. For more
information about Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement and its push
for the SHU Exclusion Law, see generally Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The
Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences, Hearing Before the Sen.
Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 112th
Cong. (2012) (statement of Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement),
http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/mental-health-alternatives-tosolitary-confinement.pdf [https://perma.cc/36PT-5BXN].
112. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137(6)(d)(1). Although most of these units serve
exclusively people with S-designations, some serve individuals with a service level of
one or two. To be sure, those individuals have been diagnosed with serious mental
illness despite the fact that OMH has not afforded them an S-designation.
113. What is often colloquially referred to as “solitary confinement” is referred to
in New York State Law as “segregated confinement,” or “the disciplinary
confinement of an inmate in a special housing unit or in a separate keeplock housing
unit. Special housing units and separate keeplock units are housing units that consist
of cells grouped so as to provide separation from the general population, and may be
used to house inmates confined pursuant to the disciplinary procedures described in
regulations.” N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 2(23).
114. The Intermediate Care Program (“ICP”) operates on a “step system.” Each
step, of which there are four, promotes increased proficiency at activities of daily
living and provides for increased privileges, such as increased access to work or
education assignments, additional program offerings, structured work programs,
increased property privileges, and increased access to other parts of the facility.
Individuals incarcerated in the ICP are provided with programming pursuant to an
individualized treatment plan developed by ICP staff. Each ICP is also expected to
develop its own program incentives, designed to secure rule compliance, support
positive behaviors, improve treatment compliance, improve program success, and
ultimately [allow] for integration into a less restrictive environment. N.Y. STATE
DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS. & N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, INTERMEDIATE
CARE PROGRAM MANUAL 3–40 (2009) [hereinafter INTERMEDIATE CARE PROGRAM
MANUAL]. See generally DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107. DOCCS and
OMH suggest several program incentives, including basic items such as extra
personal hygiene products, snack prizes, an additional shower, headphones, and
access to movies. Although advocates receive many complaints about conditions in
the ICPs, many of their clients have successfully transitioned from an ICP to general
population and reported improvement in their ability to cope with the prison
environment and manage the manifestation of their mental health needs. ICPs
operate at several maximum-security prisons, including Attica, Auburn, Bedford
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Program, Enhanced Intermediate Care Program, and Discharge
Intermediate Care Program.115 All of those units serve individuals
with S-designations or those designated service level one.116
Individuals in those units are provided with four hours of structured,
out-of-cell programming five days per week.117 That programming is
designed to promote their eventual release into the general
population setting.118 The Transitional Intermediate Care Program
provides two groups per week with programming aimed at assisting
individuals who have been in an Intermediate Care Program to
remain successfully in general population, hence the “transitional”
moniker.119
The Enhanced Intermediate Care Program and
Discharge Intermediate Care Program serve people with histories of
violence who are within 18–48 months of their approved release date
and 9–12 months of their approved release date, respectively.120
Those units provide substantially the same programming as the
regular Intermediate Care Program.121 As a result of litigation, some
Intermediate Care Programs, which were once located exclusively at
maximum-security prisons, are now located at medium security
facilities.122

Hills, Clinton, Elmira, Five Points, Great Meadow, Green Haven, Mid-State, Sing
Sing, and Sullivan Correctional Facilities. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107,
at 5; see also Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 9.40:
Intermediate Care Program Referral 1 (December 5, 2013) (on file with author);
supra INTERMEDIATE CARE PROGRAM MANUAL, at 3 (“The goal of the ICP is to
improve inmate-patients’ functioning while reducing the impact that symptoms of
mental illness and behavioral instability can have on adjustment during incarceration.
The ICP is a therapeutic community that provides mental health services and
promotes development of self-regulation, symptom management, social, recreational,
and habilitative skills. In addition to traditional clinic services, the ICP provides case
management, crisis intervention, adaptive skills training, self-help, and peer
support.”).
115. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 4–6.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 5. Before the private settlement agreement in Disability Advocates, Inc.
v. New York State Office of Mental Health required expanded treatment options for
individuals incarcerated in general population and solitary confinement, DOCCS had
already established ICPs in certain maximum-security state prisons. In response to
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, which
challenged DOCCS’s and OMH’s placement of the ICPs at only maximum-security
prisons, DOCCS and OMH opened ICPs at Albion Correctional Facility and Fishkill
Correctional Facility, both of which are medium-security prisons. Private Settlement
Agreement, supra note 25, at 7–11 (“Defendants will add ninety (90) new beds in the
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The second type of RMHTU serves people with certain solitary
confinement sanctions.123 As a result of Disability Advocates Inc. v.
NYS Office of Mental Health,124 DOCCS and OMH created new
units to serve individuals with S-designations who receive a solitary
confinement sanction of thirty days or more.125 Those individuals are
diverted from solitary confinement to a Behavioral Health Unit,126 a
Residential Mental Health Unit,127 an Intensive Intermediate Care
Program, or a Therapeutic Behavioral Unit128 to serve their
segregated confinement sanction. Individuals in the Behavioral
Health Unit are afforded two hours per day of structured, out-of-cell
therapeutic programming five days per week, whereas individuals in

Intermediate Care Program . . . in addition to the 572 current . . . beds and the 118
additional . . . beds covered by the previously approved 2004 and 2005 initiatives.”);
see also DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 5.
123. See supra text accompanying note 122.
124. See generally Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25.
125. Id. at 8.
126. The Behavioral Health Unit affords incarcerated individuals two hours per
day out-of-cell therapeutic programming and is located at Great Meadow
Correctional Facility. The Behavioral Health Unit operates similarly to the
Intermediate Care Program in that incentives are afforded and advancement is
obtained through program compliance, attendance, and positive behavior. N.Y.
DEP’T OF CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, BEHAVIORAL HEALTH UNIT ORIENTATION
HANDBOOK 2–5 (2015) (on file with author) (“The Behavioral Health Unit . . . is a
therapeutic program designed to teach you the skills necessary to solve problems and
cope with stress in a healthy, nonviolent way. By acquiring and practicing these
skills, you may reduce or eliminate the behaviors that lead to Misbehavior Reports.
This will help you re-enter general population of a DOCCS facility, another special
program, or the community. This is accomplished through Mental Health and
DOCCS treatment/programming that allows for interaction within groups, and
individual counseling.”).
127. If a participant successfully graduates to stage two in a Residential Mental
Health Unit, they are offered “at least four hours a day structured out-of-cell
therapeutic programming and/or mental health treatment . . . and . . . additional out
of cell activities consistent with mental health needs.” DOCCS Directive # 4302,
supra note 107, at 8. Residential Mental Health Units are located at Attica
Correctional Facility, Five Points Correctional Facility, and Marcy Correctional
Facility. Id.
128. The Therapeutic Behavioral Unit, which is the Residential Mental Health
Unit for women, is located at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility. Not only do
individuals in these units receive therapeutic treatment, but they can work their way
toward receiving property, services and privileges similar to those available in general
population. They are assessed on essentially the same scale that is used in the
Behavioral Health Unit, but the program is divided up into three stages with
attendant “milestones.” Each milestone is associated with additional privileges, with
the third being associated with discharge to an alternate program. N.Y. DEP’T OF
CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION & N.Y. OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ATTICA
RESIDENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH UNIT INMATE-PATIENT ORIENTATION HANDBOOK 5–
10 (Nov. 2016) (on file with author).
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the other three aforementioned units are afforded four hours of such
programming per day.129 The existence of these units, and criteria for
when DOCCS must divert or remove individuals to them, are now
codified in the SHU Exclusion Law.130
In circumstances satisfying certain codified requirements, DOCCS
and OMH are entitled to retain individuals with S-designations in
solitary confinement for over thirty days.131 First, DOCCS and OMH
must demonstrate that “exceptional circumstances” justify placing the
individual in a more restrictive environment.132 Where DOCCS and
OMH have satisfied that requirement, they must provide a
heightened level of care to those individuals.133 DOCCS and OMH
often provide such care in the Group Therapy Program, in which they
offer individuals two hours of structured, out-of-cell programming
five days per week in the Special Housing Unit itself.134
As of December 31, 2015, 1205 individuals diagnosed with serious
mental health needs were housed in an RMHTU.135 Of those
individuals, 987 were in a general population RMHTU, such as an
Intermediate Care Program.136 That number represented 39.2% of
the total DOCCS population diagnosed with serious mental health
needs.137 Of those diagnosed with a serious mental health need, 210
individuals were confined to an RMHTU for people with solitary
confinement sanctions of over thirty days, such as the Residential
Mental Health Unit.138 That number represented 8% of the total
DOCCS population diagnosed with serious mental health needs.139
These figures need some qualification, however. Prisoner rights
advocates receive frequent complaints from incarcerated persons,

129. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 4.
130. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(i) (McKinney 2017) (requiring DOCCS
to divert or remove individuals with serious mental illness from segregated
confinement where the period of such confinement could be longer than thirty days).
131. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 2.21, 137.6(d)(ii)(E) (McKinney 2017).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. DOCCS Directive # 4302, supra note 107, at 5.
135. CENT. N.Y. PSYCHIATRIC CTR., N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
2015 ANNUAL CORRECTIONS-BASED OPERATIONS STATISTICAL REPORT 3 (2015) (on
file with author).
136. Id. at 7–9.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7–9, 15.
139. Id.

2018]

GRASSROOTS CHALLENGES

461

alleging that they have been erroneously classified or misdiagnosed,
sometimes in retaliation for alleged misbehavior.140

1.

Regional Catchment Areas

The DOCCS system is divided into “Regional Catchment Areas,”
or “hubs,” which facilitate the transfer from one facility to another of
individuals who require mental health services, evaluations, or
treatment.141 There are fourteen main mental health hubs, which
generally have mental health offices, private interview rooms, and
observation cells for people who are experiencing a crisis.142
DOCCS’s crisis observation unit is called the Residential Crisis
Treatment Program.143 People may be admitted to the Residential
Crisis Treatment Program if they trigger a suicide screen upon
admission to segregated confinement,144 if they manifest behavior

140. See Mental Health Services in NY Prisons, Hearing Before the Assemb.
Comms. Corr. & Mental Health 4 (2014) (statement of Jack Beck, Dir., Prison

Visiting Project, Corr. Ass’n of N.Y.) (“Related to patients in [solitary confinement],
there has been a major shift in diagnoses in the last six years from schizophrenia and
psychoses (35% drop) to adjustment, anxiety, and personality disorders (72% rise).
With a related 36% drop in the number of S-designations, less people are eligible for
[diversion from solitary confinement], raising serious concerns about whether the
SHU Exclusion Law’s provision of a sharp line above which people receive intensive
services and below which people remain in [solitary confinement], are leading to
improper diagnoses. These concerns are even more stark given that the percentage
of the total OMH caseload designated as Level 1 has risen in recent years.”).
141. DOCCS Directive # 4301, supra note 33, at 1–3.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Id. at 4–7. Although the Residential Crisis Treatment Program and the “hub”
structure predate Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental
Health and the subsequent codification of the SHU Exclusion Law, that law
established the requirement that DOCCS or an OMH clinician must perform a
suicide screening on all individuals upon their admission into solitary confinement
and a full mental health assessment within one day of the imposition of a solitary
confinement sanction. If a suicide risk is identified, an OMH clinician must be
consulted and precautions must be taken to mitigate the potential for suicide. These
requirements were initially imposed by settlement in Disability Advocates, Inc. v.
New York State Office of Mental Health. See Private Settlement Agreement, supra
note 25, at 14. It is now codified. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(ii)(A)–(B)
(McKinney 2017). If the incarcerated individual is placed in solitary confinement at a
service level 1 or service level 2 facility, they must be fully assessed for the presence
of serious mental illness within one business day of their placement. Id. If they are
placed in solitary confinement at a service level 3 or service level 4 facility, they must
be assessed for the presence of serious mental illness within fourteen days of their
placement. Id.
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that triggers a mental health referral,145 or if they report suicidal
ideation or thoughts of self-harm.146
As a precaution, individuals who are admitted to the Residential
Crisis Treatment Program are afforded constant clinical supervision
for stabilization.147 Residential Crisis Treatment Programs consist of
Upon transfer to a
both individual cells and dorm beds.148
Residential Crisis Treatment Program cell, individuals are provided
with “amenities” commensurate with their suicide risk level as
assessed by OMH, including one specialized tear and fire resistant
mattress, two specialized tear resistant mats, one specialized tear
resistant safety smock, one pair of rubber sandals, and certain hygiene
products and eating utensils (which they are not allowed to keep in
their cells and must return after use).149 They are often unable to
receive mail or otherwise communicate with the outside world.150
OMH gives clinicians increased access to their patients in order to
extensively document the individuals’ status during their stay in the
Residential Crisis Treatment Program.151 In the event of a stay
longer than seven calendar days, additional approval by a clinical
director is required or a transfer to CNYPC is initiated.152 Individuals
in the Residential Crisis Treatment Program are to be transferred out
only where one of several criteria are met, as determined and
documented by a psychiatrist.153 DOCCS and OMH have developed

145. See N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive # 4101: Inmate
Suicide Prevention 2, 3 (Jan. 1, 2016) (on file with author).
146. See id at 15.
147. Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 4.0: RCTP
Observation Cells & Dormitory Beds 1 (June 1, 2016) [hereinafter CBO Policy # 4.0]
(on file with author) (“Observation cells should be utilized only for inmate-patients
who may be psychiatrically unstable, unpredictable and/or a danger to themselves or
others.”).
148. Id.
149. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, Directive # 4308: Residential Crisis
Treatment Program (RCTP) 4, 5 (Jan. 2, 2018) (on file with author); see also CBO
Policy # 4.0, supra note 147, at 3.
150. See generally CBO Policy # 4.0, supra note 147.
151. Id. at 4–7.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id. (“Transfers out of an RCTP Observation Cell/Dormitory Bed can occur
when the crisis precipitating the transfer to RCTP has been resolved, the psychiatric
assessment suggests the patient is capable of meaningfully participating in
programming and that return to a lower level of care represents the least restrictive
and appropriate means of treatment, the psychiatrist assessment determines the need
for an increased level of treatment, e.g. transfer to CNYPC, the need for an
observation cell level of care is no longer met, and a step-down to a Dormitory Bed is
warranted.”).
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these policies as a safeguard against tragic, avoidable suicides and
incidents of self-harm.

2.

VTC in New York Prisons: Implementation, Current Practices,
and Shortcomings

Though DOCCS and OMH have created a reasonable
infrastructure for the delivery of mental health treatment in New
York State prisons, that infrastructure is undermined by resource
deficiencies caused by the geographic siting of New York’s prisons.
One manifestation of those resource issues is DOCCS’s and OMH’s
use of VTC.
As early as the late 1990s, it was clear to much of the practicing
psychiatric community that VTC, and telemedicine more broadly,
could help close the prison resource gap.154 Although it was unclear
when or whether VTC could or would replace in-person psychiatric
evaluations,155 practicing psychologists wrote positively about the
then-existing jail and prison VTC programs.156
That said,
psychiatrists have also been vocal about the potential for negative
effects of such technology and the need to control for those negative
effects, in particular stressing the importance of clear and robust
policies and procedures for the implementation and use of the
technology.157

154. Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, Position Statement: Use of Telemedicine
Technology in Correctional Facilities, 6 J. CORR. HEALTH CARE 129, 134 (1999)
[hereinafter Position Statement] (“The use of telemedicine affords correctional

facilities many opportunities for reducing operational costs associated with providing
health care to confined individuals.”).
155. See Steven E. Hyler et al., Can Telepsychiatry Replace In-Person Psychiatric
Assessments? A Review and Meta-Analysis of Comparison Studies, 10 CNS
SPECTRUMS 403, 411–12 (2005) (“Telepsychiatry seems to be a reasonable alternative
in situations in which it is difficult or impractical to arrange for I-P assessments . . . .
Telepsychiatry could be viewed as a necessity in situations in which the alternative
might be that no psychiatrist or psychiatrist sub-specialist would be available . . . .
Whether telepsychiatry can replace [in-person] for ongoing therapy requires more
study.”).
156. See, e.g., Even Lynn Nelson et al., A Comparison of Psychiatrist Evaluation
and Patient Symptom Report in a Jail Telepsychiatry Clinic, 10 TELEMEDICINE J. &
E-HEALTH S-54, S-54 (2004) (touting the quality of prison VTC programs and
prospects for expansion).
157. Position Statement, supra note 154, at 134–35 (“Policies and procedures must
clearly define the purpose and instances in which telemedicine may be used in a
correctional facility. Regardless of the type and combination of technologies used to
provide medical care, the basic principals [sic] governing the physician/patient
relationship must remain intact. This responsibility can be met in large part by
ensuring that telemedicine policies and procedures comply with the National
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Since VTC’s implementation, both DOCCS and OMH have relied
heavily on its use for the provision of psychiatric treatment. The
reliance on VTC is an outgrowth of the challenges of staffing mental
health satellite units that are located in rural parts of New York.158 It
is a natural response to resource issues and one method by which the
State can avoid liability for failure to provide specialty care or crisis
intervention services.159 Unfortunately, VTC’s use is not governed by
robust DOCCS and OMH policy.160 It is therefore unclear how
DOCCS or OMH control for the potential drawbacks of VTC or
whether the agencies evaluated the potential negative consequences
of its use before promulgating VTC policies.161
Although DOCCS and OMH have promulgated policies
concerning the use of VTC in state prisons, those policies are not
particularly detailed.162 Pursuant to CNYPC policy, OMH maintains
a VTC coordinator at each facility that hosts a satellite unit.163
Before any VTC appointment, CNYPC staff at the facility where the
incarcerated patient is located must send copies of certain medical
documentation to the VTC unit.164 The same is true of any follow-up
VTC appointment.165 To ensure that the VTC Unit has sufficient
time to review pertinent documents, all documents must be sent at

Commission on Correctional Health Care’s Standards for Health Services that have
been developed for prisons, jails, and juvenile detention and confinement facilities.”).
158. See Letter from Donna Hall, Ph.D, Assoc. Comm’r, Div. of Forensic Servs.,
N.Y. Office of Mental Health, to Melissa Finn, MSW, Facility Review Specialist II,
N.Y. Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People with Special Needs (Mar. 22, 2016) (on
file with author).
159. See generally Position Statement, supra note 154.
160. CNYPC Corrections-Based Operations policies and DOCCS Directives cited
herein represent all DOCCS and OMH policies on the provision of VTC, specifically.
The author confirmed this by Freedom of Information Law requests to DOCCS and
OMH. Letter from Riele J. Morgiewicz, Records Access Officer, N.Y. State Office of
Mental Health, to author (Oct. 26, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from David J.
Harvey, Assistant Counsel, N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, to author (Oct.
27, 2017) (on file with author).
161. See generally supra note 160 and accompanying text.
162. See CBO Policy # 2.9, supra note 42, at 1; Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr.,
Corrections-Based Operations Policy # 3.11: Telepsychiatry Orders 1 (Mar. 16, 2016)
[hereinafter CBO Policy # 3.11] (on file with author).
163. CBO Policy # 2.9, supra note 42, at 1.
164. Id. (Documentation includes the chronological record, diagnosis record, core
history, Comprehensive Suicide Risk Assessment (CSRA), screening/admission note,
initial psychiatric evaluation, last three psychiatric progress notes, last three primary
progress notes, termination/transfer progress note, last physician’s order, most recent
medication treatment record and pharmacy print out, and most recent laboratory
results (if applicable).).
165. Id.
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least twenty-four hours prior to the appointment.166 Upon the
completion of the appointment, the VTC psychiatrist is required to
fax new medical documentation to the facility where the incarcerated
patient is located.167 CNYPC staff at that facility are then required to
discuss the treatment plan with the incarcerated patient following the
VTC session “when needed.”168 Policies provide no guidance
regarding the determination of “need.”169 DOCCS and OMH have
also promulgated a policy concerning medication orders following a
VTC session.170
That policy largely concerns documentation
171
No DOCCS or OMH policy addresses staffing,
requirements.
quantity, or quality of VTC services afforded to incarcerated
individuals.172
While VTC may appear a convenient and efficient option to close
the resource gap, it comes with many drawbacks. Perhaps the biggest
of those drawbacks is VTC’s potential to undermine trust, rapport,
and communication between physicians and patients.173 With respect
to communication, practitioners posit that VTC may undermine a
physician’s ability to assess non-verbal communication, and that
patients may be unable to adapt their communication style to suit the
medium.174
Whereas non-verbal communications are often
interpreted naturally during in-person interactions, VTC interactions
do not foster the same natural understanding of non-verbal cues.175
Assessing non-verbal communication is an important aspect of any

166. Id. at 2.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. For more on the importance of discussing treatment plans with patients,
see generally F.J. Fowler, Informing and Involving Patients to Improve the Quality of
Medical Decisions, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 699 (2011) (discussing best practices for
involving patients in treatment decisions and treatment planning).
170. CBO Policy # 3.11, supra note 162, at 1–2.
171. See id.
172. These are areas any correctional VTC policy should address, as contemplated
by the National Commission Standards. See Position Statement, supra note 154, at
135.
173. Melissa Lee et al., The Doctor Is Online: An Introduction to Text-Based
Telepsychiatry, 8 UNIV. B.C. MED. J. 33, 33 (2017) (stating that “[s]ome clinicians are
concerned that the absence of face-to-face interaction and non-verbal cues could
undermine communication during therapy” and reasoning that those losses are only
“partially” offset where clinicians take remedial measures).
174. Jay H. Shore et al., Cultural Aspects of Telepsychiatry, 12 J. TELEMEDICINE &
TELECARE 116, 117 (2006).
175. Hilty et al., supra note 47, at 18.
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reliable psychiatric assessment, particularly where a clinician is
assessing the presence of potential suicidality or suicidal ideation.176
Some practitioners posit that it is much more difficult for a patient
to establish a connection with a medical professional over VTC.177
Patients may feel disconnected because of the medium itself,
regardless of the qualifications of the physician or the degree of
attention paid to dignifying the patient and fully assessing the
patient’s needs.178 The implications of a lack of trust are particularly
acute where a physician is assessing a patient for suicidality.179
Patients are far less likely to tell the truth about their feelings where a
robust therapeutic relationship has not been established.180
Another danger of VTC is its potential to endanger the
effectiveness of diagnoses and treatment.
Scholars repeatedly
reported during the late 1990s and early to mid-2000s that deficiencies
in technology undermined the efficacy of VTC and patients’
confidence in the medium.181 As recently as 2004, some psychiatrists
tempered their positive review of VTC’s potential with concerns
about its prospective effectiveness in a carceral setting.182 Three
years earlier, several scholars published a study that indicated that
reliability results were consistently lower for VTC evaluations that
required visual observation rather than a simple self-report.183 As a
precaution, some scholars have advocated that VTC practitioners

176. Khushminder Chahal, The Utility of Assessing Nonverbal Communication in
the Psychiatric Evaluation, 12 AM. J. PSYCH. RESIDENTS 3, 3 (2017); Gretchen N.
Foley & Julie P. Gentile, Nonverbal Communication in Psychotherapy,

7 PSYCHIATRY 38, 44 (2010). In the author’s experience interviewing incarcerated
individuals with mental health needs and intellectual disabilities, a twitch of the leg, a
forlorn countenance or a rapid eye movement may indicate an otherwise non-obvious
disposition.
177. Lee et al., supra note 173, at 33.
178. Hilty et al., supra note 47, at 16 (“One concern with telemedicine is that the
technology may adversely affect . . . the development of a therapeutic alliance.”).
179. See Linda Ganzini et al., Trust Is the Basis for Effective Suicide Risk
Screening and Assessment in Veterans, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1215, 1215 (2013).
180. Jessica Sun Choi, Mental Health Services via Skype: Meeting the Mental
Health Needs of Community College Students Through Telemedicine, 25 S. CAL.
REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 331, 344 (2016).
181. See Christopher J. Caryl, Malpractice and Other Issues Preventing the
Development of Telemedicine, 12 J. L. & HEALTH 173, 201 (1998); Choi, supra note
180, at 351; Barbara M. Rohland et al., Acceptability of Telepsychiatry to a Rural
Population, 51 PSYCH. SERVS. 672, 673 (2000); Shore et al., supra note 174, at 119;
Kathleen Vybony, Legal and Political Issues Facing Telemedicine, 5 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 61, 62–63 (1996).
182. Nelson et al., supra note 156, at S-84.
183. Monnier et al., supra note 47, at 606.
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forego diagnosis where they believe that, due to the medium, they
have insufficient data.184
Finally, a third danger is VTC’s potential to undermine patient
privacy. However, this concern may be alleviated as technology
improves. Though today’s technology is by no means beyond issues
of hacking and privacy protection, it is nonetheless better suited to
ensure the confidentiality of digital medical records.185 Many
agencies—though neither DOCCS nor OMH—have moved to an
entirely digital storage model for medical and mental health
records.186
As of 2015, twenty percent of Americans lived in an area that has a
shortage of primary care physicians.187 That percentage was expected
to increase.188 This year, every prison with a mental health satellite
unit was found to be located in a city, town, or village with a shortage
of mental health professionals.189
Therefore, it would be
disingenuous to suggest that VTC should not be used in prisons to
close the resources gap, particularly as that gap widens. It is not
disingenuous, however, to suggest that DOCCS and OMH should
control for concerns about the use of VTC by developing more robust
policies concerning issues such as effectiveness of communication
over VTC and confidentiality of VTC communications. That
suggestion is bolstered by the findings of oversight agencies such as
the New York Justice Center for the Protection of People with
Special Needs (“Justice Center”), Disability Rights New York, and
Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement, some of which
crystallize the above concerns.190

184. Caryl, supra note 181, at 201.
185. Laurinda B. Harman et al., Electronic Health Records: Privacy,
Confidentiality, and Security, 14 AMA J. ETHICS 712, 712 (2012).
186. Darrelle Knight, Electronic Medical Records: Moving Jails Forward,
CORRECTIONS (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.corrections.com/news/article/22296electronic-medical-records-moving-jails-forward [https://perma.cc/KV9D-V5QF].
187. Avery Schumacher, Telehealth: Current Barriers, Potential Progress, 76 OHIO
ST. L.J. 409, 413 (2015).
188. Id.
189. UNIV. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., supra note 38.
190. See Letter from Melissa Finn, MSW, Review Specialist II, N.Y. Justice Ctr.
for the Protection of People with Special Needs, to Donna Hall, Ph.D, Assoc.
Comm’r, Div. of Forensic Servs., N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, and Anthony J.
Annucci, Acting Comm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision (March 3,
2016) (on file with author); Letter from Deborah McCulloch, Exec. Dir., Cent. N.Y.
Psychiatric Ctr., to Elena Landriscina, Staff Attorney, Disability Rights N.Y. (Dec.
12, 2016) (on file with author); Minutes, Meeting Between the N.Y. Justice Ctr. for
the Protection of People with Special Needs and Mental Health Alternatives to
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Over the last two years, the Justice Center191 has issued findings to
both DOCCS and OMH regarding psychiatric staffing in several state
prisons and has informed advocates that staffing problems are related
in part to the relative isolation of state prisons. For example, the
Justice Center issued a findings letter to DOCCS and OMH on March
3, 2016 concerning its investigation of a suicide at Attica Correctional
Facility.192 The Justice Center found in relevant part that due to
staffing shortages, the deceased individual had only one opportunity
over a thirty-day period to meet with a psychiatrist prior to his death,
and did not receive the psychiatric evaluation he was supposed to
have been afforded within one day of his admission to the Residential
Crisis Treatment Program.193 DOCCS and OMH afforded the
individual only one psychiatric evaluation, which was facilitated via
VTC and occurred immediately before his discharge from the
Residential Crisis Treatment Program.194
During that VTC
evaluation, a psychiatrist cleared the individual’s discharge from
Residential Crisis Treatment Program so that he could call his wife.195
The Justice Center found “no documentation to support that [the
Solitary Confinement (Jan. 20, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Meeting Minutes] (on file with
author).
191. The Justice Center is responsible for monitoring the quality of mental health
care provided to incarcerated individuals pursuant to the SHU Exclusion Law. N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 401-a (McKinney 2017). In exercising that responsibility, the
Justice Center conducts monitoring in segregated confinement units throughout the
state to ensure that all SHU Exclusion Law benchmarks are being met. Id. The
Justice Center ensures that SHU mental health screenings and assessments are being
conducted in a timely fashion and that DOCCS and OMH meet the other SHU
Exclusion Law benchmarks such as the mandate to “[divert and remove] inmates
with serious mental illness from segregated confinement to residential mental health
treatment units.” Id. The Justice Center also assesses the general population mental
health units, and the quality of care afforded to incarcerated individuals in all
Residential Mental Health Treatment Units. Id. The Justice Center occasionally
takes on an advocacy posture, recommending that certain incarcerated individuals be
placed into an Residential Mental Health Treatment Unit or be afforded additional
attention. Id. The Justice Center has been an integral watchdog to ensure that
mental health services are expanded upon and reinforced for individuals incarcerated
throughout the state. See id.; 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190; see also Forensic
Oversight Unit, N.Y. JUSTICE CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL
NEEDS, https://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/oversight-and-monitoring/forensic-oversight
[https://perma.cc/86UA-FJDJ].
192. See Letter from Melissa Finn, supra note 190. Due to heavy redactions in the
Justice Center’s letter and both DOCCS’s and OMH’s response, it is impossible to
ascertain how long the individual was in the Residential Crisis Treatment Program,
how many appointments he should have had, and whether he was otherwise cared for
in accordance with applicable policy and law. See id.
193. Id. at 3.
194. Id. at 1.
195. Id. at 3.
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individual] . . . received any mental health assistance between his
discharge from the [Residential Crisis Treatment Program], and when
he died by suicide on [redacted].”196
These findings raise serious questions about the quality of care
provided. Were warning signs present but missed due to the quality
of the VTC medium? Would the individual have engaged more
readily with the psychiatrist if the evaluation had been conducted in
person? And if so, would he have received more careful attention?
Would the psychiatrist have approved the individual’s discharge after
an in-person evaluation? These questions cannot be answered, but
these are valid inquiries given the above-cited literature.197
The Justice Center raised the issue of psychiatric staffing very
directly in its findings by referencing a previous finding it issued to
DOCCS and OMH regarding “the lack of psychiatrists in the Attica
[Correctional Facility].”198 The Justice Center stated that both
agencies had acknowledged the problem, reporting that Attica
Correctional Facility added an additional VTC Unit to “enhance the
number of hours for assessments via VTC, and recruitment strategies
were continuing.”199 Despite these measures, the Justice Center
found that the deceased man had not received care consistent with
the applicable OMH policy.200 The Justice Center also found that the
individual was not afforded a step-down from the Residential Crisis
Treatment Program,201 contrary to best practices.202 In consideration
of those findings, the Justice Center requested an update from the
respective agencies on the “current status of an on-site psychiatrist at
the Attica Correctional Facility, and the current number of available
hours per week of VTC assessments.”203 In response, the Associate
Commissioner of OMH stated that the agency “continues to actively

196. Id.
197. See sources cited supra notes 173–86.
198. See Letter from Melissa Finn, supra note 190.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 4. Individuals who are afforded a “step down” from Residential Crisis
Treatment Program are not immediately discharged upon a finding that they are no
longer a suicide risk, but are phased back to their original placement more gradually.
For some, this will mean that they are discharged not from the Residential Crisis
Treatment Program back to their cell immediately, but are discharged first to a
Residential Crisis Treatment Program dorm bed for less frequent observation than
they would have been afforded in a Residential Crisis Treatment Program cell
placement, but more frequent observation than they would have been afforded in
their cell. CBO Policy # 4.0, supra note 147, at 7–8.
202. Letter from Melissa Finn, supra note 190, at 4.
203. Id.
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recruit for an on-site psychiatrist at Attica Correctional Facility. The
current number of available hours per week for VTC assessments is
60–68 hours. An additional VTC unit was added, along with
continued recruitment strategies to date, as indicated in the August
correspondence.”204 OMH still relies heavily on VTC for the
provision of such services at Attica.205 Unfortunately, neither the
Justice Center nor OMH extended their findings to the quality of
VTC itself or to its impact upon the relevant suicide.
The Justice Center has continually reiterated similar staffing
concerns to Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement. In
June 2013, the Justice Center reported to Mental Health Alternatives
to Solitary Confinement that certain Intermediate Care Programs
were experiencing staffing shortages, and that others—including
Fishkill and Green Haven, both Intermediate Care Programs located
closer to New York City—were considered “model [Intermediate
Care Programs]” for staffing, documentation, and programming.206
During that meeting the Justice Center emphasized that the drop in
admissions to the Intermediate Care Program likely had to do with
staffing issues.207 The Justice Center subsequently reported to Mental
Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement a serious shortage of
psychiatrists, doctors, and providers in the prisons, and posited that
the vacancies exist due to the location of the facilities.208 Although
the Justice Center informed Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary
Confinement that it has not “focused on” the shortages issue, it
reported that it encouraged OMH to be “more creative in
recruitment and retention” initiatives.209 Similarly, the Justice Center
reported to Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement that
appointments are often missed because staff is not available.210
Attica Correctional Facility was used as an example, where there was
one psychiatrist on site and four days of VTC despite the large size of
Attica’s mental health case load.211

204. Letter from Donna Hall, supra note 158, at 1.
205. 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190.
206. Minutes, Meeting Between the N.Y. Justice Ctr. for the Protection of People
with Special Needs and Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement
(Nov. 14, 2013) (on file with author).
207. 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.; CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., 2014 UPDATED CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION
REPORT ON ATTICA 16–17 (2014), http://www.correctionalassociation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/Attica-2014-CA-Updated-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/37BM-
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In late 2016, OMH shared similar findings with Disability Rights
New York, New York State’s Protection and Advocacy System for
individuals with disabilities. Disability Rights New York has the
federal statutory responsibility to protect and advocate for individuals
with disabilities,212 and has devoted a significant amount of its
resources to advocacy for individuals with mental health needs
incarcerated in New York State prisons.213 Disability Rights New
York was informed via letter that “[g]iven the limited psychiatric
resources at Elmira [Correctional Facility], cases are clinically
prioritized with the VTC psychiatrists in an effort to effectively serve
all of the inmate-patients receiving mental health treatment in that
unit.”214 In this case, Disability Rights New York was concerned with
OMH’s failure to afford an incarcerated individual with a psychiatric
assessment upon his transfer to the Residential Crisis Treatment
Program, in accordance with the applicable policy.215 That individual
was not seen by a psychiatrist for an evaluation until long after his
transfer to the Residential Crisis Treatment Program, and was seen
by VTC rather than in person.216 OMH excused its failure to provide
a prompt assessment as a “clinical oversight,” and closed by reporting
its “continue[d] efforts to recruit and retain psychiatric staff, and to

BLDX] (“As of July 2013, the latest available data, there were 456 people at Attica,
or roughly 21% of Attica’s total population, on the Office of Mental Health (OMH)
caseload. Seventy-five of those individuals were in an Intermediate Care Program
(ICP)—a residential treatment program for patients with “serious mental illness,” 37
were in a Transitional ICP, and an additional nine people were in a Residential
Mental Health Unit—an alternative placement to the SHU for people with serious
mental illness sentenced to disciplinary confinement. The remaining 335 people, at
least 34 of whom were diagnosed with a “serious mental illness,” were in general
population or SHU, facing the same conditions documented throughout this report.
The presence of such large numbers of people with mental health needs at Attica,
and particularly in Attica’s general population, raises concerns about these
individuals’ safety and well-being.”) (internal citations omitted).
212. NEW YORK EXEC. LAW § 558 (McKinney 2017). See generally The
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.
§ 15043 (2012); The Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act
of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (1986); The Protection and Advocacy for Individual Rights
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794e (1992).
213. Protection & Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Program, PAIMI
Priorities, DISABILITY RTS. N.Y., http://www.drny.org/p-a-for-people-with-mi--paimi.html [https://perma.cc/B74S-9KEN] (“Priority VII: Advocate to ensure that people
in prisons and jails receive appropriate mental health services in the least restrictive
environment, including reducing and eliminating solitary confinement for individuals
with mental illness and assuring that appropriate discharge planning is provided for
individuals returning to the community.”).
214. Letter from Deborah McCulloch, supra note 190, at 1.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1–2.
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maximize the resources currently available at Corrections Based
Operations.”217
If VTC is properly viewed as a second-best measure, there should
be a commitment towards identifying the ways to bring services in
line with people’s needs. This necessarily means analyzing whether
incarcerated people are better served by remaining closer to the
communities they come from, and what commitment New York must
make to investing more resources in those communities.218 The most
salient questions for movement lawyers to ask are: what resources can
we bring to bear to force that conversation upon DOCCS and OMH?
Can litigation force DOCCS to correct VTC so that it can continue to
be used as a means to address the broader resources problems, or are
other approaches more promising? And even if movement lawyers
correct deficiencies in DOCCS and OMH’s VTC program, what does
that do to address the broader geographical problems that prompted
the agencies to use VTC in the first place?
II. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF LITIGATION SOLUTIONS ABSENT
GRASSROOTS APPROACHES
Movement lawyers have long used Eighth Amendment impact
litigation as a tool to expand and improve medical and mental health
services in prisons.219 It is unclear, however, whether such litigation is
the best tool to address deficiencies in VTC as a medium, or the
geographic and resources problems that caused the expansion of VTC
in prisons. Part II provides a brief overview of some of two potential
avenues for improving VTC through Eighth Amendment litigation.220
217. Id. at 2.
218. Similar ideas have inspired New York State’s new approach to juvenile justice.
See, e.g., Close to Home Initiative, N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF CHILDREN & FAMILY
SERVS., http://ocfs.ny.gov/main/rehab/close_to_home/ [https://perma.cc/7SHM-DGH7]
(explaining New York State’s juvenile justice reforms aimed at “keep[ing] youth
close to their families and community”).
219. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in
Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1988) (discussing and appraising
theoretical models of prisoners’ rights litigation).
220. Section II.A does not provide an exhaustive list of all litigation options for
addressing the problems identified in this Article. Other Eighth Amendment
theories may be useful in addressing the problems identified in this Article, as may
state law causes of action including medical malpractice and negligence. State law
solutions are beyond the scope of this Article, as it narrowly examines certain
reported decisions involving VTC and/or mental health care in prisons. For more
information on other potentially relevant or useful Eighth Amendment strategies and
state law causes of action, refer to the materials cited in Section III.A, particularly
JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL MANVILLE, PRISONERS’ SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL
(4th ed. 2010).
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It ultimately concludes that litigation is not the answer, but only part
of a larger grassroots strategy to reverse the sprawl of the prison
system and bring resources closer to home. Litigation has a role to
play, but it will not create sustainable change without a coexisting
grassroots movement.
A. An Abridged Overview of the Eighth Amendment Framework
The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment221 forbids the denial of treatment for serious medical
needs222 of prisoners, including serious mental health needs.223 A
prima facie case for the denial of mental health treatment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment requires a plaintiff to meet a two-pronged
test.224 First, the plaintiff must establish that they have a serious
mental health need.225 The first prong is considered the “objective
prong.”226 As such, the defendant must prove the existence of their
serious mental health need through evidence of prior diagnosis and
treatment or the obviousness of the need for treatment.227 Not every

221. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
222. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference
is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs, or by prison
guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally
interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced,
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action
under § 1983.”).
223. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 502 (2011) (upholding a lower court population
cap order under the Prison Litigation Reform Act based in part on California’s
longstanding unconstitutional failure to provide needed mental health treatment,
pointing to “the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly
inadequate provision of medical and mental health care”). Prior to Plata, courts
treated psychiatric care as part of medical care for Eighth Amendment purposes, and
the issue had not been addressed at the Supreme Court level. See Langley v.
Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[P]sychiatric or mental health care is an
integral part of medical care. It thus falls within the requirement of Estelle v.
Gamble, that it must be provided to prisoners. The difference between the two
varieties of care are simply factual and administrative.”); Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80,
82 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding preliminary injunction on Eighth Amendment claim
based on deliberate indifference to serious mental health treatment needs).
224. Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1094–102 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted
on other grounds and case remanded, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), opinion reinstated on
remand, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011).
225. Conn, 591 F.3d at 1095.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., Johnson v. Busbee, 953 F.2d 349, 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that a
serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
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mental health need is considered serious.228 The Second Circuit
considers several questions in determining whether a need is serious,
including “whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the
need in question as important and worthy of comment or treatment,
whether the medical condition significantly affects daily activities, and
the existence of chronic and substantial pain.”229
The Supreme Court added the second prong, the deliberate
indifference standard, in Farmer v. Brennan.230 To meet the second
prong, the plaintiff must establish that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to that need because they knew of, and
disregarded, a substantial risk to the plaintiff’s health and safety.231
The second prong is considered the “subjective prong.”232 As such, a
prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment
for denying humane conditions of confinement unless the official was
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of harm existed, and actually drew that inference.233
A defendant who did not treat an incarcerated individual properly
because he or she did not realize how sick they were, or what the
problem was, may not be deliberately indifferent due to a lack of
actual knowledge.234
It is unclear how courts will evaluate deliberate indifference claims
that turn predominantly on a question about the quality of VTC care
because federal courts have not yet examined the use of prison VTC
as the gravamen of an Eighth Amendment claim.235 They have
examined its use only tangentially and, even then, the issue has never

treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would recognize the
necessity of a doctor’s attention).
228. See Tillery v. Owens, 719 F. Supp. 1256, 1286 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff’d, 907 F.2d
418 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a serious mental health need is one “that has caused
significant disruption in an inmate’s everyday life and which prevents his functioning
in the general population without disturbing or endangering others or himself”).
229. Brock v. Wright, 325 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Tillery, 719 F. Supp. at 1286.
230. 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994).
231. Id.
232. Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1018, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See generally, e.g., Gutwein v. Taos Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:15-cv-00672, 2017
WL 3602028 (D.N.M. Jan. 20, 2017); Cantazaro v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 08-11173,
2009 WL 2139210 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2009); Rouse v. Caruso, No. 06-10961, 2009
WL 891728 (E.D. Mich. Mar 31, 2009); Thomas v. Seago, No. G-05-0431, 2009 WL
242311 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2009); MacDonald v. Schriro, No. CV 04-1001-PHX-SMM,
2008 WL 2783472 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2008); Coyle v. Cambra, No. 02-1810 SBA, 2005
WL 2397517 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005).
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reached a circuit court of appeals.236 Additionally, as scholars
frequently acknowledge, Eighth Amendment medical and mental
health care cases are highly fact specific and can be difficult to win.237
Federal court challenges to VTC, which have thus far focused only
on medical care, are not particularly promising for plaintiffs.238 In
those cases, courts have not second-guessed a corrections
department’s reliance on the VTC.239 Instead, courts have been silent
on VTC or passingly concluded that it did not pose a quality of care
concern as applied to the plaintiff.240 Most courts that have addressed
prison VTC have framed any disagreement with its use as a
disagreement about “course of treatment,” insufficient to support an
Eighth Amendment claim.241
Although absent clear precedent for such a challenge, it is useful to
examine two potentially applicable Eighth Amendment theories.
Both of these theories may help a plaintiff overcome a dispositive
motion, as has happened in one case involving VTC. Similarly, these
theories may help a plaintiff combat a defendant’s assertion that a
reasonable mental health judgment was made during a VTC
evaluation.242 Ultimately, however, even where these strategies are
236. See generally cases cited supra note 235. In each of these cases, the losing
party did not appeal.
237. See, e.g., Doretha M. Van Slyke, Hudson v. McMillian and Prisoners’ Rights:
The Court Giveth and the Court Taketh Away, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1727, 1754 (1993)
(reasoning that “by creating legal barriers to Eighth Amendment claims through high
standards of proof, the Supreme Court makes upholding these rights increasingly
difficult”); see also Lori A. Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to
Impossible for Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 531 (2004) (stating that
“proving a ‘serious medical need’ and subjective deliberate indifference poses
exceptionally high hurdles for mentally ill inmates to overcome when attempting to
obtain a remedy for a violation of their Eighth Amendment right to adequate mental
health care”).
238. See generally cases cited supra note 235. It is still instructive to examine these
cases, however, because courts apply essentially the same test to evaluate cases
concerning deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and deliberate
indifference to serious mental health needs. BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 220, at
64 n.453 (stating that “[m]ental health care is subject to the same constitutional
standard as other forms of prison medical care: deliberate indifference to serious
mental health needs violates the Eighth Amendment or, for pretrial detainees, the
Due Process Clause”).
239. See generally cases cited supra note 235.
240. In MacDonald v. Schriro, for example, the court held that the plaintiff’s right
to medical care was not violated without opining on VTC, despite the fact that
plaintiff’s claim turned on a perfunctory VTC evaluation. 2008 WL 2783472, at *3. In
Coyle v. Cambra, the court framed plaintiff’s disagreement with VTC as a mere
disagreement over a course of treatment. 2005 WL 2397517, at *3.
241. See Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *3.
242. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 220, at 41 n.274.
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successful, Eighth Amendment litigation cannot address the
geographic problems raised in this Article without a concomitant
grassroots approach.

1.

Defendant Failed to Conduct an Adequate Examination, Take
an Adequate History, or Ask Necessary Questions243

As explained above, scholars have found that VTC hampers
communication between physicians and patients and interferes with
the development of a therapeutic alliance. Those endemic problems
may inform an Eighth Amendment claim under one theory in
particular—a plaintiff may bring a claim that the corrections officials
were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious mental health
needs where those officials failed to “inquire into essential facts.” A
long line of Eighth Amendment cases has established that such a
claim is cognizable if an incarcerated plaintiff was not fully evaluated
by prison mental health staff for a known, serious mental health need
and was therefore harmed.244
One of the few cases involving VTC at the district court level,
MacDonald v. Schriro,245 turned on a “failure to inquire into essential
facts” theory.246 In MacDonald, the plaintiff, Allan S. MacDonald,
brought a deliberate indifference claim after a prison physician
performed on him an extremely perfunctory VTC knee exam and
therefore failed to fully assess his knee injury.247 The court denied
the physician defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Although
the MacDonald court did not squarely address the quality of VTC
medical services, one could reasonably conclude from the facts of the
case that VTC enabled defendant’s perfunctory approach to
MacDonald’s reported ailment.

243. This theory is based upon a theory articulated in BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra
note 220, at 44.
244. See, e.g., Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 1996) (denying summary
judgment to Defendant physician who discontinued plaintiff’s psychotropic
medication without reviewing plaintiff’s chart or conducting a proper psychiatric
interview); see also Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 711 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
that psychologist’s failure to follow up on clear suicidal ideation supported a
deliberate indifference claim).
245. No. CV 04–1001–PHX–SMM (MHB), 2008 WL 2783472, at *3 (D. Ariz.
July 17, 2008).
246. Id. at *3 (“Therefore, the crux of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant rests
upon his November 6, 2003 telemedicine appointment. Plaintiff asserts that
(1) Defendant failed to examine Plaintiff’s knee and ignored Plaintiff’s reported
symptoms; (2) Defendant failed to read or obtain a copy of the June 11, 2003 MRI,
despite the fact that Plaintiff told Defendant he was reading an outdated MRI . . . .”).
247. Id.
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The record in MacDonald reflects that MacDonald received a
subpar medical consult chiefly because that consult was conducted via
VTC. MacDonald presented evidence that during the course of the
VTC consult, the physician never asked him to remove his long pants
(which obscured his knee) or stand up.248 The physician instead
recommended that MacDonald continue with the previously
prescribed course of treatment—a knee brace and inflammatory
drugs for pain—despite never having examined the knee or evaluated
its health.249 MacDonald implored the physician to conduct a more
thorough evaluation and to obtain and review his most recent MRI,
to no avail.250 MacDonald saw the physician three years later and
ultimately underwent knee surgery shortly thereafter.251 During that
procedure, the surgeon noted possible recurrent left meniscus tears
and a loose bone fragment.252
MacDonald asserted, among other claims, that the physician acted
with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to
adequately examine his knee during the VTC consult and by ignoring
the symptoms he reported during that consult.253 MacDonald alleged
that he attempted to convey to the physician what he was
experiencing, and the results of his most recent MRI.254 Instead, the
physician refused to review the new MRI or credit MacDonald’s
report of his condition.255 Although MacDonald did not squarely
challenge VTC, he made clear that VTC enabled the physician to all
but ignore his assertions.256 One could easily posit that it is much
harder to ignore reported symptoms during a one-on-one assessment
than it is to ignore them during a VTC consult, particularly where a
treating physician is not in the room with the patient and where the
patient is not encouraged to develop any real rapport with the VTC
consultant.

248. Id. at *1.
249. Id.
250. Id. at *3.
251. Id. at *1.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *3.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. The court noted this in finding that the crux of MacDonald’s claim against the
defendant rested upon his telemedicine appointment. Id.
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MacDonald did not receive a merits decision in this case, but the
court did deny the physician’s motion for summary judgment,
reasoning that:
A jury could infer that Defendant did not perform a physical
examination on Plaintiff’s knee on November 6, 2003, did not listen
to Plaintiff’s symptoms, and did not obtain or review Plaintiff’s June
2003 MRI that revealed multiple bone infarcts. The jury could also
infer that these actions were deliberate, based on Plaintiff’s
testimony that he tried to explain to [Defendant] that his injury was
new and that a new MRI had been performed, but that Defendant
refused to listen.257

The court also found that a reasonable jury could conclude that the
defendant’s deliberate indifference caused a three-year delay in the
plaintiff’s surgery, which was sufficient to impose liability.258
MacDonald reifies many concerns about VTC, even as applied to
mental health evaluations. Although psychiatrists do not perform
physical examinations, they nonetheless must make observations that
can be missed over VTC, such as observations of rapid movements
and body language.259 Those observations are crucial to proper
diagnoses, effective treatment, and the development of an
understanding and a rapport between the clinician and the patient.260
MacDonald’s legal theory was an effective one and should be
considered for use where VTC exacerbates a physician’s failure to
fully inquire into the conditions of an incarcerated plaintiff. The
record in MacDonald, and the literature on VTC’s deficiencies, make
clear that courts should evaluate “failure to inquire” claims involving
VTC in a fashion more favorable to the plaintiff. Absent a significant
change in the law, however, that is unlikely. Furthermore, a plaintiff
who pursues a deliberate indifference claim based upon this theory
will have to establish, probably through expert testimony, that VTC
does in fact hamper communication and discourage physicians from
performing thorough examinations. That claim would be weighed
against well-established rules affording deference to prison officials in
medical and mental health care cases and deference to professional
judgment more generally.261

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at *4.
Id.
See discussion supra Part I.
See discussion supra Part I.
See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 220, at 41 nn.274–75.
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Defendant Failed to Remedy Known Systemic Deficiencies, such
as an Institutional Lack of Access to Qualified Staff or Repeated
Failures to Afford Proper Placement262

As explained earlier, some corrections departments have used
VTC to avoid Eighth Amendment liability for failure to provide
access to qualified specialist staff. For some departments, however,
expanded use of VTC may not be enough to avoid such liability.263
And for departments that do not yet use VTC, the need for mental
health services has so far outstripped the availability of qualified
medical staff that the federal courts have taken notice.264 In a recent
and particularly relevant case, Braggs v. Dunn,265 the Middle District
of Alabama held that the Alabama Department of Corrections’
failure to hire and retain qualified psychiatric staff could support a
deliberate indifference claim.266 Braggs, particularly its remedial
process, is instructive for plaintiffs framing a challenge to VTC mental
health treatment.267
Prior to Braggs, advocates and journalists had written about the
geographic sprawl of the Alabama prison system and its impact upon
quality of care.268 In fact, legislation had been introduced to open
262. This theory is based upon a theory articulated in BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra
note 220, at 44, 58–64.
263. Though no court has so ruled, it is clear from precedent in cases turning on the
availability of specialist care that any claim involving the provision of VTC as a
substitute for in-person specialist care will turn largely upon the qualifications,
training, and expertise of VTC consultants in the pertinent area of psychiatry. See id.
at 44, 46–47.
264. Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1193 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (“Three
conditions contribute to all of the deficiencies in [the Alabama Department of
Corrections’] treatment of mentally ill prisoners: understaffing of mental-health care
providers, understaffing of corrections officers, and overcrowding . . . . Correctional
and mental-health understaffing, both alone and in combination, impose substantial
risks of serious harm to mentally ill prisoners, and overcrowding compounds these
risks.”).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1208 (“Insufficient mental-health and correctional staffing at [the
Alabama Department of Corrections] undermines the availability and quality of
individual and group counseling sessions. First, as explained earlier, inadequate
mental-health staffing combined with the increasing number of prisoners on the
mental-health caseload has driven up the number of prisoners on each counselor’s
caseload. As a result, both the frequency and quality of counseling sessions have
suffered over time, according to both experts and MHM providers.”).
267. See generally id.
268. Kristen Connor, Governor Bentley Introduces Alabama Prison
Transformation Initiative Act, WHNT NEWS19 (Feb. 23, 2016), http://whnt.com/2016/
02/23/governor-bentley-introduces-alabama-prison-transformation-initiative-act/
[https://perma.cc/2KWN-PFTB] (“The . . . design of the facilities are causing
inefficiencies in the operation of the prison system, including . . . increasing costs of

480

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

new prisons to respond both to that sprawl, and to overcrowding.269
Although most advocates argue that prison expansion is the wrong
response to these issues,270 such proposals illustrate the extent to
which sprawl has been linked to reduced quality of care in state
prison systems.271 Braggs did not squarely challenge the location of
Alabama’s prisons, but nonetheless challenged the overcrowding and
quality of care issues that are clearly caused by the geographic
dispersal of prisons systems.272
Braggs, a case filed by several prisoners with mental health needs
and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program,273 was split by the
court into three phases: Phase 1, Phase 2A, and Phase 2B, the last of
which has yet to be fully litigated.274 Phase 1 encompassed ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims by incarcerated persons with physical
disabilities.275 The claims in that phase were settled.276 Phase 2A
includes Eighth Amendment, ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and due
process claims by incarcerated persons with mental health care

transporting inmates from prison to medical care facilities, increasing correctional
and support staff costs because of the geographic disparity of the system and the
antiquated design of prison facilities, and increasing medical costs due to
inefficiencies in delivering medical services to inmates.”).
269. Id.; see also Alabama Initiative to Support Construction of Four New Prisons,
CORR. NEWS (Mar. 9, 2016), http://correctionalnews.com/2016/03/09/alabamainitiative-support-construction-four-new-prisons/
[https://perma.cc/BS7N-DQWB]
(“Outdated designs combined with age and deterioration is causing numerous
operational problems throughout the prison system. This includes increasing regular
maintenance and repair costs, and increasing correctional and support staffing costs
because of the geographic disparity of the system.”). The bill was framed as a way to
provide higher quality and increased rehabilitative programming.
270. Michelle Chen, How Closing a Jail Could Make New York City Stronger, THE
NATION (May 17, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-closing-a-jail-couldmake-new-york-city-stronger/ [https://perma.cc/4TZW-BCWU] (explaining Rikers
Island’s lack of proximity to the families of the incarcerated, lawyers, and social
services, and quoting Alyxandra Goodwin of the Black Youth Project in support of
full-on jail and prison abolition rather than jail and prison relocation).
271. See Robert J. Bentley, Former Governor of Ala., State of the State Address
(Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2016/02/state_of_the_
state_full_text_o.html [https://perma.cc/7TV7-Y5ZQ] (stating that the Alabama
Prison Transformation Initiative Act would close fourteen smaller, geographically
disbursed prisons and open four “state of the art” regional prisons).
272. See generally Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
273. Id. at 1178–79.
274. Id. at 1181–82. Phase 2B will address Eighth Amendment claims related to
medical and dental care. Id.
275. Id. at 1181 (noting the claims and disposition of Phase 1).
276. See Braggs v. Dunn, 318 F.R.D. 652, 658 (M.D. Ala. 2016) (granting final
approval of the Phase 1 settlement).
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needs.277 The ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in Phase 2A were
settled first.278 The due process challenges to involuntary medication
policies and procedures were ultimately settled by the parties as
well.279
The Phase 2A Eighth Amendment claims, about which this Article
is concerned, went to trial and were resolved on the merits.280 In its
lengthy disposition, the court addressed a number of deficiencies in
mental health care in Alabama State prisons, including screening,
treatment, monitoring, and policies on housing and discipline of
people with serious mental health needs.281 Deficiencies in each of
those areas, driven partially by geographic issues, combined to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation in Phase 2A of the
litigation.282
Braggs was fundamentally a challenge to major systemic and
institutional deficiencies in mental health care in the Alabama State
prisons system.283 Although the Alabama State prison system’s
mental health case load consisted of 3400 people at the time of the
Braggs filing,284 the system had only 346 general population mental
health beds and 126 crisis beds.285 The Alabama Department of
Corrections, the state agency responsible for operating Alabama’s
state prisons, contracted with a for-profit entity to provide mental
health services in its prisons.286 That entity provided meager numbers
of mental health staff, though it repeatedly requested and was denied
funding from the Alabama Department of Corrections to provide
more staff.287
277. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (detailing procedural background of “[t]his
extremely complex case”).
278. See Braggs v. Dunn, 321 F.R.D. 653, 659 (M.D. Ala. July 25, 2017) (granting
final approval of settlement of ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for incarcerated
persons with only mental disabilities). While the court did not issue an opinion and
final order until July, a preliminary approval of the settlement had been issued in
February of 2017. Id.
279. See Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14cv601-MHT, 2017 WL 5665334, at *1, *9 (M.D.
Ala. Nov. 27, 2017) (outlining the court’s rationale in approving the settlement on
September 6, 2017).
280. Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1180.
281. Id. at 1267–68.
282. Id. at 1267 (“Simply put, [the Alabama Department of Corrections’] mentalhealth care is horrendously inadequate.”).
283. Id. at 1180 (“The plaintiffs assert that the State of Alabama provides
constitutionally inadequate mental-health care in prison facilities[.]”).
284. Id. at 1181.
285. See id. at 1182–83.
286. Id. at 1183–84.
287. Id. at 1194.
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The court found that lack of mental health staff and general prison
overcrowding caused several instances of harm and substantial risks
of harm sufficient to find Eighth Amendment violations on behalf of
a class of individuals with mental health needs.288 Those systemic
risks included: an inadequate intake process; inadequate referral
process; inadequate classification of mental health needs; inadequate
utilization of mental health units; inadequate treatment planning;
inadequate psychotherapy; improper use of mental health units;
inadequate out-of-cell time and programming; inadequate suicide
prevention and crisis care; failure to provide crisis treatment to those
who need it; placement of people who need crisis cells into an
inappropriate environment; unsafe crisis cells; inadequate monitoring
of individuals displaying suicidality; inappropriate release from
suicide watch; and inadequate follow up.289
The remedial process of Phase 2A of Braggs continues as of
January 2018.290 Advocates should follow that process closely.291 If
the Alabama Department of Corrections closes some of its mental
health treatment resource gaps by utilizing VTC, it may ultimately fail
to provide treatment of the quality it could provide with a sufficient
number of on-site mental health professionals.292 Braggs will provide
a blueprint case theory for addressing deficiencies attendant to

288. Id. at 1193. The Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections
described his own prison system as “wrestling with a ‘two-headed monster’:
overcrowding and understaffing.” Id. at 1184. The court noted overcrowding,
understaffing, and the compounding risks associated with both conditions throughout
its opinion. See, e.g., id. at 1194–95 (“The sheer magnitude of overcrowding within
[the Alabama Department of Corrections] has meant that some [Alabama
Department of Corrections] facilities . . . house more than double the number of
prisoners they are designed to hold . . . . [The Alabama Department of Corrections]
has maintained mental-health staffing levels that are chronically insufficient across
disciplines and facilities. Witness after witness identified significant mental-health
staffing shortages as one of the major reasons for [the Alabama Department of
Corrections’] inability to meet the rising mental health care needs of prisoners.”).
289. See id. at 1192–93. The court discusses each of these risks in great detail. See
generally id. at 1191–1250.
290. See Phase 2A Order Modifying Order on Hospital-Level Care Remedy,
Braggs v. Dunn, No. 2:14-cv-601-MHT (M.D. Ala. Jan. 11, 2018) (No. 1542)
(scheduling hearings for January 29, 2018 and February 5, 2018 to address part of
remedial steps).
291. It remains to be seen whether the remedy will satisfy the court’s call for
immediate and long-term solutions. See Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1268 (“The court
emphasizes that given the severity and urgency of the need for mental-health care
explained in this opinion, the proposed relief must be both immediate and long
term.”).
292. For examples of the deficiencies that may accompany the use of VTC in this
remedial process, see supra Section I.B.
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VTC,293 as VTC leads to many of the same risks of harm already
identified by the court.294 If the remedial process does not make a
major systemic impact, Braggs will demonstrate what other cases
have demonstrated—that courts have limited power to address the
underlying geographic sprawl that creates the resource problems they
identify.295
In Coyle v. Cambra296 and Rouse v. Caruso,297 courts addressed
similar systemic issues, although those issues were not framed
through a geographic lens. In Coyle, plaintiff Travis Coyle brought a
deliberate indifference claim based upon defendants’ failure to
provide “adequate, timely, and necessary specialist medical care” for
his knee.298 Before he brought the case, Coyle filed a prison
grievance and requested a meeting with an orthopedist concerning his
knee injury, only to receive a response over two weeks later stating
that because the prison’s contract with orthopedists had expired and
had not been renewed, he would have to be seen through
telemedicine.299 Coyle appealed that grievance response five days
later, explicitly arguing that telemedicine was inadequate.300 He did
not receive a response to that appeal, but was eventually seen a
second time by the prison’s primary care physician instead, who
decided to continue to treat Coyle with medication for his condition
and await the telemedicine conference.301
The telemedicine
conference never took place because the applicable waiting list was
full and the prison entered into a new contract with an on-site
orthopedist before Coyle advanced on that list.302
To support his deliberate indifference claim, Coyle alleged that
specialists simply were not available during contract renegotiations,
implying that telemedicine did not afford true access to specialists.303
293. See generally Braggs, 257 F. Supp. 3d at 1267–68 (detailing the scope of the
Eighth Amendment violations).
294. See discussion supra Section I.B (highlighting deficiencies in VTC mental
health treatment through correspondence between the Justice Center and Disability
Rights New York and DOCCS and OMH regarding the use of VTC in New York
State prisons).
295. The Braggs court, despite issuing a lengthy opinion, did not address the state
of prison mental health in Alabama through a geographic lens.
296. No. C 02-1810 SBA PR, 2005 WL 2397517 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2005).
297. No. 06–10961, 2009 WL 891728 (E.D. Mich. Mar 31, 2009).
298. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *7.
299. Id. at *3–4.
300. Id. at *4.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at *7.
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The Court disagreed with Coyle and granted summary judgment to
defendants.304
Coyle’s argument was similar to the plaintiff’s argument in
MacDonald v. Schriro,305 discussed above. MacDonald was subjected
to the exact type of telemedicine consultation that Coyle sought to
avoid306—a perfunctory assessment by a clinician who neither
credited the patient’s complaints nor fully examined relevant
records.307 Like MacDonald, Coyle argued that the VTC medium
aided the incompleteness of his consultation.308 Unfortunately, the
court did not evaluate Coyle’s VTC argument that telemedicine was
inadequate and that therefore necessary specialist care was not made
available.309 Instead, the court endorsed the defendants’ argument
that the defendants were not responsible for the delay and that, in
consideration of Coyle’s multiple appointments with medical staff
between 2000 and 2002, he received reasonable care under the
circumstances.310
The court held that even if the defendants were negligent,
negligence is not sufficient to support a deliberate indifference
claim.311 Neither are most “[differences] of medical opinion,” which
is how the court described the dispute between Coyle and the
defendants.312 The court emphasized that a plaintiff can make out a
deliberate indifference claim based upon a difference of opinion only
where they can show that the course of treatment doctors performed
was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and chosen in
“disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.”313 In this
particular situation, the court pointed to the fact that the physicians
had seen the plaintiff and had evaluated his symptoms in response to
his complaints, and that plaintiff’s allegations therefore did not rise
beyond a simple difference of opinion.314 The court therefore granted

304. Id. at *15.
305. No. CV 04–1001–PHX–SMM (MHB), 2008 WL 2783472, at *3 (D. Ariz.
July 17, 2008).
306. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *3.
307. Compare Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *9–12, with MacDonald, 2008 WL
2783472, at *1.
308. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *9–12.
309. Id. at *9–13.
310. Id.
311. Id. at *8.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *9.
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the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Coyle
had not made such showing.315
A major difference between MacDonald and Coyle is that
MacDonald confined his argument to the quality of the evaluation he
personally received, whereas Coyle explicitly tied his argument to his
displeasure with VTC as a medium.316 The Coyle court did not
consider that disagreement, but confined its analysis to the quality of
care that Coyle received.317 This distinction is material in our
assessment of whether courts are willing to address systemic issues
related to the provision of VTC, or are more likely to address VTC’s
deficiencies as applied to particular plaintiffs.
In Rouse v. Caruso, the Eastern District of Michigan similarly
confined its analysis and failed to reach the systemic issue raised by
the plaintiff.318 The Rouse court held that it could not enjoin the
Michigan Department of Corrections’s telemedicine policy as the
plaintiff, Arthur Rouse, had not proven that it was
unconstitutional.319 Rouse had alleged—and the defendants did not
dispute—that the Michigan Department of Correction did not
maintain medical staff at the Mid-Michigan/Pine River Correctional
Facility320 after 8:00 p.m. or on the weekends, and that telemedical
services were afforded only during “life threatening emergencies”
pursuant to the applicable policy.321 The defendants admitted that
staff vacancies had caused a reduction in hours and that the inability
to fill those vacancies was caused by the absence of viable candidates,
but maintained that “just because Mid-Michigan does not have
medical staff present in the facility for eight hours a day does not
establish that Plaintiff has not received adequate or appropriate

315. Id. at *13.
316. Compare MacDonald, 2008 WL 2783472, at *3, with Coyle, 2005 WL 2387517,
at *3.
317. Coyle, 2005 WL 2397517, at *8.
318. Rouse v. Caruso, No. 06–10961, 2009 WL 891728, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar 31,
2009).
319. Id.
320. Mid-Michigan Correctional Facility and Pine River Correctional Facility have
since been consolidated. The consolidated facility is called Central Michigan
Prison
Directory,
MICH.
DEP’T
OF
CORR.,
Correctional
Facility.
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,4551,7-119-68854_1381_1385—-,00.html
[https://perma.cc/DG28-YSE7]. It is located in Gratiot County, Michigan, an area
noted for its lack of physicians. CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICH., WHERE ARE
THE PRIMARY CARE DOCTORS? A LOOK AT MICHIGAN’S PRIMARY CARE PHYSICIAN
SHORTAGE 7–11, app. B (2015).
321. Rouse, 2009 WL 891728, at *4.
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medical care.”322 The defendants disputed Rouse’s reading of the
applicable telemedicine policy, which was that the policy permitted
diagnoses over the phone.323 Although it did not resolve the factual
dispute regarding the applicable telemedicine policy, the court
determined that any decision to enjoin the policy would be
premature, albeit acknowledging that the policy could be read to
permit phone diagnoses.324
B.

A Grassroots Approach is Necessary to Correct the Systemic
Problems Litigation Usually Cannot Address

As illustrated above, the viability of challenging VTC using an
Eighth Amendment theory is questionable at best. Most advocates
agree that VTC is here to stay and devote attention to either closing
the general prison medical care resources gap,325 or to other
initiatives that promise to improve prison medical care generally.326
One such initiative is the closure of prisons and their relocation to
more resource-rich areas, both as a response to medical and mental
health resource issues and as a response to other problems caused by
prisons’ geographic isolation.327 Those initiatives, particularly where
pursued by grassroots organizations, have at times succeeded.328
They present greater prospects for successful systemic change than

322. Id. at *5.
323. Id. at *6.
324. Id. at *8.
325. The American Civil Liberties Union, Perkins Coie, Jones Day, and the
Arizona Center for Disability Law, for example, recently settled a case against
several Arizona Department of Corrections senior officials. Included in the
stipulation of settlement is a provision that requires the Arizona Department of
Corrections to provide telemedicine practitioners with their patient’s recent medical
records before a telemedicine consultation. Stipulation at 12, Parsons v. Ryan, No.
CV 12-00601-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz. Oct. 14, 2014); see also Ollove, supra note 46
(“[David] Fathi, of the [American Civil Liberties Union], said too often, doctors
practicing telemedicine on inmates don’t have their full medical histories. That was a
federal court’s finding in a recent lawsuit concerning prison health care in Arizona
penitentiaries. One provision of the court-approved settlement in the case requires
mental health providers practicing telemedicine on prisoners be provided with their
recent medical records, including laboratory results. ‘Telemedicine does offer some
positives but it is never going to be as good as having an on-site physician who can
perform hands-on diagnosis and treatment,’ Fathi said.”).
326. See, e.g., CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., HEALTH CARE IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS:
A REPORT OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE PRISON VISITING
COMMITTEE OF THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK 69–80 (2000),
https://static.prisonpolicy.org/scans/healthcare.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ5L-VHY4].
327. See discussion infra Part III.
328. See discussion infra Part III.
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does litigation alone, as they address the underlying geographic cause
of VTC, not merely the problems VTC causes.
III. A GRASSROOTS SOLUTION TO THE GEOGRAPHIC CRISIS
CAUSING SUBPAR PRISON MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT
The litigation landscape cannot singlehandedly improve VTC,
reverse its use, or cure the geographic problems causing its use.329
But even where litigation is the best tool, and even where it succeeds,
it often creates only fleeting change.330 That is because no litigation
lasts forever, and lawyers representing defendants in civil rights cases
use ample tools—sunset dates, termination motions, and the like—to
skirt permanent implementation of private settlement agreements
and consent decrees.331 In the prison and jail context, some of those
tools were created by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which limits
the scope and duration of consent decrees.332 Because of litigation’s
structural limitations, it is an imperfect tool to achieve widespread
systemic change.333 When paired with grassroots activism, however,
litigation serves as a much more potent tool to create that change.334
Two New York-based organizations are most instructive in pairing
grassroots and litigation models—Mental Health Alternatives to
Solitary Confinement (“MHASC”),335 and #CLOSErikers.336 Neither
329. See supra Section II.A (discussing the Eighth Amendment framework).
330. See generally Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human
Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2305 (2004) (“[T]his
essay cautions that such litigation should not replace other forms of human rights
advocacy. An over-reliance on adversarial litigation, as opposed to other processes
to promote durable social change and the ability of the judicial process to address
major social and economic problems.”).
331. A sunset date is a date upon which a private settlement agreement or a
consent decree will end. Defendants often attempt good faith implementation of a
private settlement agreement only until the sunset date. If the parties have not
agreed on a sunset date, defendants may file a termination motion and argue that
they have substantially complied with the terms of the agreement.
332. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (West 2017).
333. Ronald Slye, Community Institution Building: A Response to the Limits of
Litigation in Addressing the Problem of Homelessness, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1045,
1049–54 (1991) (explaining why litigation is “a poor tool for comprehensively
addressing broad and complex social issues that require long-term structural
solutions” irrespective of the doctrinal landscape).
334. Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the
Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1999, 2057–61 (2007);
Judith E. Kroons, Fair Housing and Community Empowerment: Where the Roof
Meets Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 75, 87–93 (1996).
335. Hearing on Mental Illness in Correctional Settings Before the New York State
Assembly Standing Committees on Correction and Mental Health, 2014 Leg. (2014)
(statement of Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement, describing the
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organization has litigated in its own name, but both count among its
members people who have litigated to combat the issues the
respective groups were formed to combat and both organizations
have utilized litigation in their multi-pronged advocacy efforts.337
Although MHASC and #CLOSErikers do not focus solely on prison
siting issues, each has included those issues in their analyses.338 They
have secured major positive changes in the allocation of prison and
jail resources, and can serve as models for the multi-pronged
strategies advocates should use to reduce the sprawl of the New York
State prison system and force DOCCS and OMH to utilize the mental
health resources that exist only near urban centers.339
MHASC provides the best example of a grassroots organization
channeling a major litigation victory into permanent change. Prior
MHASC’s creation, lawyers had worked since the 1980s to improve
the treatment of people with mental health needs in solitary
confinement in New York State, predominantly through litigation.340
For example, the State settled Langley v. Coughlin,341 Eng v.
Goord,342 and Anderson v. Goord 343 in the 1980s and 1990s, all of
which challenged subpar mental health treatment in New York’s

organization as “a coalition of more than sixty organizations and hundreds of
concerned citizens, advocates, mental health and criminal justice professionals,
formerly incarcerated people, and their family members [that advocates] for humane
criminal justice policies for people with psychiatric disabilities”).
336. #CLOSERIKERS, http://www.closerikers.org/ [https://perma.cc/E9Z8-Y4FB].
Other organizations, such as the Committee to End the Marion Lockdown, the New
York City Jails Action Coalition, and Critical Resistance have combatted prison
siting issues and problems attendant to the geography of America’s mass
incarceration epidemic. Those organizations have further illustrated the power of
multi-pronged, grassroots approaches, though their work is not addressed in this
Article.
337. See discussion infra Part III.
338. Tanya Christian, #CLOSErikers: Here’s Why the Entire Country Should Be
Paying Attention, ESSENCE (May 8, 2017), https://www.essence.com/news/glennmartin-close-rikers-campaign [http://perma.cc/5SCM-7UFA] (quoting Glenn Martin,
founder of #CLOSErikers, concerning the unique issue of Rikers Island’s location);
see also 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190.
339. See discussion infra Part III.
340. See discussion infra Part III.
341. Stipulation and Order, Langley v. Coughlin, 84 Civ. 5431 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27,
1989).
342. Settlement Agreement, Eng v. Goord, 80 Civ. 385S (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1998).
For the report required by Eng, see STUART GRASSIAN, ENG SITE VISIT ONE (1999),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/Grassian_Report_Eng_Site_Visit_One.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7A9-25V2].
343. Settlement Agreement, Anderson v. Goord, 87 Civ. 141 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2003) (on file with author).
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prisons, particularly for people in solitary confinement. Langley,344 in
particular, was brought on behalf of a class of individuals incarcerated
at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility.
Those cases brought
temporary change to individual facilities, but did not have the type of
lasting systemic impact plaintiffs had hoped for.345 In fact, over
fifteen years after the Langley Stipulation346 was implemented,
incarcerated individuals with serious mental health needs continued
to be placed in solitary confinement not only at Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility, but statewide.347
Community activists, advocates, and lawyers determined that they
could address systemic problems only by developing a new grassroots
strategy guided by people directly affected by those problems. They
envisioned a movement that used three tools—litigation, legislation,
and public education—rather than a movement that fought battles
only in the courtroom.348 MHASC was created shortly before

Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health

was filed, in pursuit of that type of movement.349 Both before and
during the litigation, members of MHASC engaged in a public
education campaign concerning the issues raised in the litigation.350
They attended community meetings with the National Alliance on
Mental Illness351 and New York Association of Psychiatric
Rehabilitation Services,352 testified at public hearings on mental

344. Langley, 84 Civ. 5431.
345. Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public
Safety Consequences, Hearing Before the Sen. Judiciary Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 112th Cong. 2–3 (2012) (statement of
Sarah Kerr, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society, Prisoners’ Rights Project).
346. Langley, 84 Civ. 5431.
347. Sarah Kerr, Litigation and Legislation Efforts to Improve Mental Health
Treatment for Prisoners in New York, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE PRISON LAW
2010, at 15 (2010) (on file with author).
348. See Implementation of Special Housing Unit (SHU) Exclusion Law Providing
Effective Mental Health Treatment in Prison Suicides, Hearing Before the Assemb.
Comms. on Corr. & Mental Health, 2011 Leg. 2 (2011) (statement of Sarah Kerr,
Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Society, Prisoners’ Rights Project).
349. See id.; Press Release, N.Y. Ass’n of Psychiatric Rehabilitation Servs., GNS,
TU: Sponsors Pledge SHU Bill Passage to Assure Permanent Policy Change in NYS
(Apr. 18, 2007); see also History, MENTAL HEALTH ALTERNATIVES TO SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT, https://boottheshu.wordpress.com/history/ [https://perma.cc/2YG4UJ9W]; discussion supra Introduction.
350. See sources cited supra notes 348–49.
351. For more information on this institution, see NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
https://www.nami.org/ [https://perma.cc/3E88-C5HK].
352. For more information on this institution, see N.Y. ASS’N OF PSYCHIATRIC
REHABILITATION SERVS., INC., http://www.nyaprs.org/ [https://perma.cc/5E93-FZAZ].
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health care in state prisons,353 and prepared reports about the
mistreatment of people with mental health needs in solitary
confinement.354 MHASC’s public education campaign created the
groundswell for the first iteration of the SHU Exclusion Bill,
introduced in 2003.355 By the time Disability Advocates, Inc. had
settled,356 the second iteration of the SHU Exclusion Bill had already
passed the New York State Legislature and been vetoed by then
Governor George Pataki.357
Because of the sustained public pressure created by MHASC, that
veto did not kill the bill. The bill also did not die in its third iteration,
which passed the New York State Legislature but was amended after
further negotiation with the governor’s office.358 In 2008, less than a
year after the state settled Disability Advocates, Inc., a then-amended
SHU Exclusion Bill was passed and signed into law by Governor
Spitzer.359 Governor Paterson later proposed amendments to the
SHU Exclusion Law that would have undercut many of the law’s
specific requirements.360 Thanks in part to the impact of MHASC’s
public education campaign, the legislature rejected those changes
after a lengthy hearing.361 The SHU Exclusion Law has helped to
mitigate the impact of the end of the Disability Advocates, Inc.
settlement in late 2011.362

353. See Press Release, Mental Health Alternatives to Solitary Confinement, As
Bill Ending State’s Practice of Solitary Confinement of Prisoners Moves Ahead in
NYS Legislature, Advocates Call for Prompt Passage and Approval by Governor in
the Twelve Remaining Days of Session (2007), https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/sites/
default/files/MHASC_Press_Release_2007.pdf [https://perma.cc/64MJ-RC4M].
354. See id.; see also Historical Documents, MENTAL HEALTH ALTERNATIVES TO
SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT,
https://boottheshu.wordpress.com/history/historicaldocuments/ [https://perma.cc/W84H-SG25].
355. A.B. A08849A, Reg. Sess. 2003–2004 (N.Y. 2003).
356. See Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25, at 31.
357. See A.B. A3926A, Reg. Sess. 2005–2006 (N.Y. 2006); S.B. S2207C, Reg. Sess.
2005–2006 (N.Y. 2006); see also Sol Wachtler, Opinion, A Cell of One’s Own,
N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
24,
2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/
nyregionopinions/24CIwachtler.html [https://nyti.ms/2FnsOfW].
358. See A.B. A4870, Reg. Sess. 2007–2008 (N.Y. 2007); S.B. S00333B, Reg. Sess.
2007–2008 (N.Y. 2007); “Boot the SHU” Bill Becomes Law in New York, 18 PRO SE
MAG., Winter 2008, at 2 (“Governor Spitzer’s office worked with Assembly and
Senate leaders to modify the bill in accordance with information from DOCS and
OMH leadership.”).
359. See A.B. A09342, Reg. Sess. 2007–2008 (N.Y. 2008); S.B. S06422, Reg. Sess.
2007–2008 (N.Y. 2008); see also 2008 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1 (McKinney).
360. See sources cited supra notes 348–49.
361. See sources cited supra notes 348–49.
362. Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25, at 27.
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Although the SHU Exclusion Law did not codify all of the
protections of the Disability Advocates, Inc. private settlement
agreement, it codified many of the most crucial ones.363 Most
notably, the SHU Exclusion Law greatly restricted the placement of
individuals with serious mental health needs in solitary
confinement.364 As opposed to the litigation-only strategies pursued
during the 1980s and 1990s, the three-prong strategy utilized during
the 2000s through MHASC achieved a more sustained systemic
impact.365 Although problems remain, quality of care has improved
and the census of people with mental health needs in solitary
confinement has dropped.366 MHASC achieved ever-elusive systemic
change.
Without MHASC’s work, the Disability Advocates, Inc. private
settlement agreement367 may have suffered the dismal fate of similar
agreements in prison cases—defendants may have been tempted to
dismantle any gains won by litigators after the end of monitoring and
the conclusion of the settlement’s term.368 Today, MHASC continues
to build upon the SHU Exclusion Law in its biannual meetings with
the Justice Center and its close collaboration with other advocacy
groups to expand mental health treatment options in the state
363. See discussion supra Section II.A (detailing the private settlement agreement
and the SHU Exclusion Law).
364. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 137.6(d)(i) (McKinney 2017).
365. Kerr, supra note 347, at 15–22.
366. Mental Health Services in NY Prisons, Hearing Before the Assemb. Comms.
on Corr. & Mental Health 1 (2014) (statement of Jack Beck, Dir., Prison Visiting
Project, Corr. Ass’n of N.Y.) (“As a result of intense scrutiny and demand for
enhanced services by prison mental health patients, their families, the legislature,
courts, and prison and mental health advocates, DOCCS and OMH have increased
and in some cases improved mental health services over the last decade. Most
significantly, in large part because of a 2007 litigation settlement in Disability
Advocates, Inc. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, and the Special Housing
Unit (SHU) Exclusion Law—passed by the NYS legislature in 2008 and gone into full
effect in July 2011—there has been a diversion of people with the most serious
mental illness (SMI or S-designated) from solitary confinement, and a substantial
increase in the number of both disciplinary and non-disciplinary Residential Mental
Health Treatment Units (RMHTUs).”).
367. See generally Private Settlement Agreement, supra note 25.
368. See, e.g., Health Care in New York State Prisons, Hearing Before the
Assemb. Comms. on Corr. & Health, at 5–7 (Oct. 30, 2017) (statement of Stefen R.
Short, Staff Attorney, Prisoners’ Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society of N.Y.C.)
(concerning the dismantling of the reforms mandated by the consent decree in
Milburn v. Coughlin, 79 Civ. 5077 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (modified final judgment)); see
also Letter from author to Cathy Sheehan, Deputy Counsel, N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. &
Cmty. Supervision, 1–2 (Aug. 29, 2017) (concerning DOCCS’s rollback of a major
reform mandated by the private settlement agreement in Medina v. Fischer, 11-cv176 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) which had expired in May 2017).
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prisons.369 MHASC’s work achieved the re-allocation of state
resources to provide improved and more widespread treatment
options for incarcerated individuals with mental health needs.370
Although geographic problems remain, the resource re-allocation
that drove the implementation of the SHU Exclusion Law is proof of
what is possible.
#CLOSErikers is another example of a movement that has built off
of the success of decades of litigation and public advocacy by not only
lawyers, but advocates, activists, and, most notably, people who are
directly impacted by the scourge of Rikers. Rikers Island is a 400acre island in the East River that serves as New York City’s main jail
complex.371 The island is notorious for its culture of violence and
staff brutality, inhumane conditions of confinement, and woeful
medical and mental health treatment.372 Family members, friends,
and advocates must make an arduous journey to reach the island,
because of its remote geographic location and poor public
transportation options.373
Each of these problems has been
documented extensively over several decades in multiple forums—
newspapers have written about them,374 federal courts have
documented them in their opinions,375 and advocates have testified to
369. See, e.g., 2017 Meeting Minutes, supra note 190.
370. See discussion supra Part III.
371. Michael Schwirtz, What Is Rikers Island?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/nyregion/rikers-island-prison-new-york.html
[https://nyti.ms/2oJAH6O].
372. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CRIPA INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND 4–51 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usaosdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20Rikers%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QPB-2V
DK] (regarding a Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act investigation of the
New York City Department of Correction jails on Rikers Island); see also Dana
Goldstein et al., Inside Rikers Island, by the People Who Live It, N.Y. MAG. (Jun. 28,
2015, 9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/inside-rikers-islandinterviews.html [https://perma.cc/YV3R-LDRW].
373. See Edgar Sandoval & Sarah Ryley, Activists Slam de Blasio’s Plan to
Renovate Rikers Island ‘Hell,’ N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2017, 11:41 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/activists-slam-de-blasio-plan-renovate-rikersisland-hell-article-1.3002003 [https://perma.cc/G6NB-CEJ5] (discussing Rikers
Island’s remote location).
374. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Opinion, A Culture of Violence on Rikers
Island, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/opinion/aculture-of-violence-at-rikers-island.html [https://nyti.ms/2Fkmd5Z].
375. See, e.g., Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(“Systematic deficiencies in the operation of [the Correctional Institution for Men on
Rikers Island], most significantly, overcrowding, overreliance on open dormitory
housing, lack of adequate classification, inadequate staffing and supervision, and
inadequate systems for controlling, investigating and disciplining misuse of force have
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them in front of New York City Council376 and the New York City
Board of Correction.377
#CLOSErikers is a movement led by formerly incarcerated
individuals
who
are
affiliated
with
the
nonprofit
378
JustLeadershipUSA.
#CLOSErikers kicked off its work in 2016
and within one year, it achieved its core demand: in 2017, New York
City Major Bill de Blasio committed to closing Rikers.379 The success
of #CLOSErikers is tied in large part to a multi-pronged effort
spanning many decades.
For decades, horrendous conditions at Rikers have been the
subject of litigation and advocacy. By many accounts, New York
City’s modern jail reform saga began in 1970 with the death of Young
Lord Julio Roldán at Manhattan Detention Center, often referred to
as “the Tombs.”380 Roldán’s death mobilized the community against
the decrepit conditions in the New York City jails, and mobilized the

led to a world where inmates suffer physical abuse, both by other inmates and by
staff, in a chillingly routine and random fashion.”).
376. See generally, e.g., Examining Violence in New York City Jails and the City’s
Response, Oversight Hearing Before the New York City Council (May 6, 2015)
(statement of the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union), https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/
testimony-regarding-city-councils-examination-violence-nycs-jails [https://perma.cc/
5S6R-WFGX].
377. Hearing on Proposed Rule Regarding Enhanced Supervision Housing, Before
the N.Y.C. Bd. of Corr., at 8–9 (Dec. 19, 2014) (statement of Gabrielle HorowitzPrisco, Dir., Juvenile Justice Project, Corr. Ass’n of N.Y.), http://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Correctional%20Association%20(Revised%20and%20Origi
nal).pdf [https://perma.cc/FWQ8-2Q65] (“In discussing the sheer brutality children
and adults on Rikers Island face day in and out, we want to acknowledge that these
problems long preceded the current Department of Correction (DOC) and city
administration . . . . The Department of Justice Report is shocking not for its
revelations—the violence on Rikers, including that against children, was made public
long ago. What is shocking is how little has been done to protect the children and
adults on Rikers, despite this knowledge. The tentacles of brutality on Rikers are
historic and deep.”).
378. See JustLeadershipUSA—Campaign to Close Rikers, OPEN PHILANTHROPY
PROJECT (Feb. 2016), https://www.openphilanthropy.org/focus/us-policy/criminaljustice-reform/justleadershipusa-close-rikers-campaign
[https://perma.cc/DSU2M5PC].
379. See Bill de Blasio, Mayor of the City of New York, Statement from Mayor
Bill de Blasio on Closure of Rikers Island (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/
office-of-the-mayor/news/193-17/statement-mayor-bill-de-blasio-closure-rikersisland#/0 [https://perma.cc/F6ZS-TFDR]; see also How Do We Close Rikers?,
#CLOSERIKERS (Oct. 3, 2017), http://www.closerikers.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/
10/closerikers-10years-demands.pdf [https://perma.cc/5D83-DKCR].
380. See Jason B. Nicholas, A History of Hell: How Rikers Island Became a
Modern Municipal Abomination, VILLAGE VOICE (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2017/04/11/a-history-of-hell-how-rikers-island-becamea-modern-municipal-abomination/ [https://perma.cc/LH5V-E453].
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New York City Board of Correction and the Legal Aid Society to
take action.381 The Legal Aid Society subsequently filed several
major cases about conditions in the New York City jails, including
Rikers Island.382
One outcome of this litigation was that it forced city officials, at
least briefly, to confront the problems stemming from the geographic
isolation of Rikers Island. In 1978, with numerous class actions still
pending and with conditions in city jails at a nadir, Mayor Ed Koch
appointed Herb Sturz Deputy Mayor for Criminal Justice.383 Deputy
Mayor Sturz was keenly aware of the conditions in the city jails and
endeavored to fix them.384 As a first step, he agreed to consolidate
and settle pending class action cases concerning conditions on Rikers
Island and he proposed to sell the island to New York State and move
detainees to new, modern facilities in each borough.385 He was later
quoted as stating that the idea was to “put[ ] accused persons right
near the courthouse and closer to their families.”386 Unfortunately,
that plan fell through due to pushback from unions and uncertain
legislative prospects.387 In the 1980s and 1990s, before Rikers could
be “fixed,” “tough on crime” policies and the city’s response to the
crack epidemic combined to balloon the population on Rikers Island
and in other city jails.388 As discussed earlier, the criminalization of
mental health needs also played a role in this development.389

381. See id.
382. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1977); Detainees of
Brooklyn House of Det. v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041, 1042 (2d Cir. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.3d 333, 335 (2d
Cir. 1974); Valvano v. McGrath, 325 F. Supp. 408, 412–13 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
383. Mark Schmitt, The Persuasion Broker, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 19, 2009),
http://prospect.org/article/persuasion-broker [https://perma.cc/3LUE-JLX4] (“Sturz
entered government in 1978, serving as deputy major and later as planning
commissioner in the early years of Mayor Ed Koch, an underappreciated period of
innovation and change in New York City.”).
384. See Nicholas, supra note 380.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Clyde Haberman, Rikers Sale Proposal ‘Dead,’ Commissioner Asserts,
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/03/nyregion/rikers-saleproposal-dead-commissioner-asserts.html [https://perma.cc/KSZ9-C637].
388. See Timothy Egan, Crack’s Legacy: A Special Report; A Drug Ran Its
Course, Then Hid with Its Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/09/19/us/crack-s-legacy-a-special-report-a-drug-ran-itscourse-then-hid-with-its-users.html [https://nyti.ms/2kFpvsN] (“Over the last 10
years, the New York police made nearly 900,000 drug arrests—more than any other
city in the world. Almost a third were for using and selling crack. But a broader look
at the arc of the crack years suggests that it was not the incarceration of a generation,
or the sixfold increase in the number of police officers assigned to narcotics, that
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The Legal Aid Society’s consolidated class action—now known as
Benjamin v. Brann390—is still pending before the Southern District of
New York with major systemic issues still unaddressed.391 The
Prisoners’ Rights Project of the Legal Aid Society continues to
litigate that case, which is now over forty-two years old, underscoring
the intractable nature of the problems at Rikers.392 The Prisoners’
Rights Project has also litigated an essentially uninterrupted series of
use of force cases out of the city jails.393

turned the tide in New York, which the police called the crack capital of the
world . . . . In Washington, however, the drug arrest rates actually declined in some
of the peak crack years—and the city still recorded a steeper drop than New York in
the percentage of its young residents using cocaine from 1990 to the present . . . . In
Bushwick, the police cordoned off the Well in the early 90’s and special teams of
officers made thousands of arrests. So many people were sent to jail that Rikers
Island became known as a Bushwick block party.”).
389. See discussion supra Part I (highlighting the criminalization of manifestations
of mental health needs).
390. No. 75–cv–03073–LAP (S.D.N.Y. filed June 24, 1975).
391. See id. (demonstrating that issues left unaddressed include lighting, fire safety,
sanitation, ventilation, and cooling of extended confinement units).
392. There have been eleven reported decisions in the case, many of which
underscore the intractable conditions and problems in the city jails. See, e.g.,
Benjamin v. Schriro, 370 F. App’x 168, 169–71 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming order
requiring city to carry out its proposed plan to renovate jail ventilation); Benjamin v.
Horn, 353 F. App’x 473, 473–74 (2d Cir. 2009) (vacating and remanding decision
terminating sanitation provisions of order); Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 41, 44, 57
(2d Cir. 2003) (affirming most findings regarding unconstitutional environmental
conditions in certain jails); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 184, 190–91 (2d Cir.
2001) (affirming findings of unconstitutional counsel visiting and restraint practices);
Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (affirming order requiring
state to remove from the city jails people convicted of felonies and sentenced to a
prison term); Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073(HB), 2006 WL 1370970, at *1, *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006) (extending and supplementing an order concerning
incarcerated individuals with conditions causing heat sensitivity); Benjamin v. Fraser,
No. 75 Civ. 3073(HB), 2002 WL 31845111, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2002) (holding city
in contempt for its failure to comply with a 2001 order concerning restraints);
Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 CIV. 3073(HB), 1998 WL 799161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13,
1998) (finding unconstitutional fire safety conditions in several jails); Benjamin v.
Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561, 566–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding city in contempt for its
failure to comply with an order concerning food); Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp.
140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding city in contempt for its failure to comply with an
order concerning housing); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 688 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (holding jail crowding unconstitutional and ordering compliance with a
population cap).
393. See, e.g., Nunez & United States v. City of New York, No. 1:11-cv-5845 (LTSTHK) (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d 203, 205–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F. Supp. 2d 450, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The case profile for
the ongoing Nunez case is available at Case Profile, CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., https://www.clearinghouse.net/
detail.php?id=12072 [https://perma.cc/9ZR2-C68H].
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Now, #CLOSErikers has bridged a gap between the dogged efforts
of litigators and advocates to challenge horrific conditions at Rikers
and the community’s demands for much broader systemic change.
The Legal Aid Society and virtually every other group that has played
a role in the Rikers reform and Rikers closure movements has an
official seat at the #CLOSErikers table.394 Organizational decisions
are made in a truly collaborative way. Lawyers do not monopolize
conversation and do not discern strategy in a vacuum. For the first
time, a multi-pronged approach has been developed that provides
advocates of all stripes and all backgrounds with a space to talk,
theorize, and strategize on the best way to solve the Rikers
problem—the foremost among them being the culture and Rikers’
geographical location.
Recently, the Independent Commission on New York City
Criminal Justice and Incarceration Reform, or the Lippman
Commission,395 issued detailed findings about the atrocious
conditions of confinement on Rikers Island, stemming from a culture
of brutality and dehumanization.396 The Commission recommended
Rikers Island’s closure.397
The Lippman Commission report’s
findings concerning Rikers Island’s culture of brutality and
dehumanization, and poor conditions of confinement largely mirror
what #CLOSErikers and advocates have been saying for decades—
Rikers Island’s lack of proximity to courts and family members
isolates people detained there from critical support systems.398
#CLOSErikers put geographic considerations at the center of its
argument to close the Island.399 Those considerations were partially
responsible for #CLOSErikers’ success.400 But only through a multi-

394. See
Partners,
#CLOSERIKERS,
http://www.closerikers.org/partners/
[https://perma.cc/K6TT-4KZT].
395. INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE & INCARCERATION REFORM, A
MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY 13 (2017) [hereinafter A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY],
http://www.morejustnyc.org/#home-1 [https://perma.cc/ZDV9-AD2M].
396. Id. at 13–14.
397. Id. at 14.
398. These findings are not new. Entities such as the New York City Board of
Correction have found that detainees miss a bulk of their off-island medical and
mental health appointments, due in part to distance and resources issues. Health
Care in New York State Prisons, Hearing Before the Assemb. Comms. on Corr. &
Health (Oct. 30, 2017) (statement of Bobby Cohen); see also A MORE JUST NEW
YORK CITY, supra note 395, at 13–16.
399. See Fact Sheets, #CLOSERIKERS, http://www.closerikers.org/reimaginingcriminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/W4AU-6KAD] (fact sheet information available by
scrolling down page).
400. See, e.g., id.
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pronged grassroots strategy were those considerations given full
voice. Even Deputy Mayor Sturz could not achieve what the
advocates achieved where truly working in tandem.
CONCLUSION
Law is all too often billed as a neutral arbiter of social problems,
and litigation is all too often billed as the vehicle for achieving
neutral, socially just outcomes. For that reason, lawyers are trained
to develop their litigation skills before most other skills, and are
convinced that almost anything is achievable through litigation. In
most cases, however, law and litigation cannot fit their bill. As it
relates to New York State prisons, law and litigation have proven
insufficient to create sustained systemic change on their own.401 The
same will prove true as advocates work to address the geographic
sprawl of the prison system and its impact on mental health
treatment, particularly the use of VTC and other technologies.402
People who are passionate about solving those problems should
borrow significantly from MHASC, #CLOSErikers, and other
organizations that have paired the law and litigation with more robust
grassroots strategies that center the narratives of people who are
directly impacted.403 Those organizations provide a blueprint for
working toward the larger goal of closing upstate prisons and taking
advantage of mental health resources available only in more well
populated urban centers.404 Only by building these nontraditional
movements can we achieve sustainable systemic and institutional
change.

401.
402.
403.
404.

See supra Section II.B.
See supra Part II, III.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.

